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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he idea underlying both the American and the European
regimes is the same: courts should decide in the spirit of the
* Professor of Criminal and Private International Law at Sunderland University, and has
previously lectured at Cambridge University and Leeds University. He graduated from Trinity
College, Cambridge University with a First Class Honours Degree in Law (1988), and was
awarded the Dr. Lancey Prize and Holland Scholarship to facilitate study in the U.S. Professor
Reed completed an LLM (Comparative Law) at the University of Virginia, and also became a
Solicitor of the High Court of England and Wales. He has contributed over two hundred
publications worldwide through monographs, textbooks, and leading journal articles. These
publications have taken place in England, Australia, Ireland, and the United States, notably in
Law Reviews of New York, Georgia, Florida, Arizona and Los Angeles. From 2005-2009, he
was delighted to be included in Who's Who in American Law.
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general principle, normally applying the specific rules but
overriding these rules should the general principles so require.
Both regimes, thus, try to combine the virtues of rules with the
advantages of standards. And the simple fact that Americans and
Europeans have more or less independently arrived at the same
model, might be seen as proof that a combination of precise rules
and standards is economically the most efficient approach in
choice of law.'
A party to a commercial contract has an understandable aim to
ensure that relevant terms and conditions of the agreement are as clear
as possible. 2 Prioritization is given to effecting optimal economic
objectives which group around certainty and predictability, contrary to
general tortious implications where the lex loci delicti is a lottery, and
wholly unanticipated. 3 Party rationalization, in tandem with
promulgation of individual foresight, applies to the planned negotiations
of commercial agreements as a concomitant of aspirational behaviour.4
These shared goals of certainty, predictability and clarity have enhanced
significance in the international context.5 A common feature of modem
commercial agreements involves a bifurcatory separation of the parties
and actions between different states.6 When a dyspeptic litigant seeks
redress under the contract, and the laws of the impacted states are
discordant over contractual import, then resolution of the choice of law
question is impacted.7 The parties in this multistate contract may have
1. Giesela Rihl, Methods and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective,
24 BERKLEY J.INT'L L. 801, 840 (2006) (internal footnotes omitted).
2. See Richard J. Bauerfield, Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract
Conflicts ofLaw: PartyAutonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659, 1660
(1982); Michael Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agreements-New York's
Approach, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 323 (1980); Peter Kincaid, RationalisingContract
Choice ofLaw Rules, 8 OTAGO L. REV. 93, 93 (1993).
3. See Adrian Briggs, Choice of Law in Tort and Delict, 4 LLOYD'S MAR. & CoM. L.Q.
519, 520 (1995); Jonathan Harris, Choice ofLaw in Tort-Blending in with the Landscape of the
Conflict ofLaws?, 61 MOD. L. REV. 33, 33 (1998); C.G.J. Morse, Torts in PrivateInternational
Law: A New Statutory Framework, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 888, 896 (1996). See generally Alan
Reed, The Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 and the Need for
Escape Devices, 15 Civ. JUST. Q. 305 (1996).
4. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts
Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REv. 1248, 1273 (1997).
5. Konrad Zweigert, Some Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private
InternationalLaw or What is Justice in Conflict ofLaws, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 284 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Levey v. Saphier, 370 N.Y.S.2d 808, 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (implicating
application of New York law although the adoption of Delaware legal framework would have
left the position unaltered).
7. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the
Close of the Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 571, 578 (1999); Rilhl, supra note 1, at 801;
Mo Zhang, PartyAutonomy andBeyond: An InternationalPerspective of ContractualChoice of
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inserted a specific choice of law clause.8 A particularized choice of law
rule, that of party autonomy, has inculcated claims to be supererogatory,
within defined templates. Anglo-American experience, however, has
vacillated over the pre-eminence attached to this doctrine of party
autonomy, but as subsequently charted in this Article, pragmatism has
prevailed over opaque theory, especially in the United States, and a
significant degree of collinearity now prevails on both sides of the
Atlantic through the statutory footing provided by the novel Rome I
Regulation and state adoption of the Second Restatement. Both
perspectives provide for express party choice of law, 10 and a hybrid
eclecticism of rebuttal presumptions in the absence of choice with
flexibility provided by the overall localizing test dependent on "closest
connection" or "most significant relationship."
Indeed, it is an opportune moment to review the degree of
harmonization in private international law, and beneficial lessons from
comparative extirpation of ideological perspectives advanced by some
commentators. The English home landscape has been completely
supplanted by European initiatives, and for contracts concluded
subsequent to December 17, 2009, choice of law will be governed by
the Rome I Regulation, replacing the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act
Law, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 511, 520 (2006).
8. See Bauerfield, supra note 2, at 1659; Gruson, supra note 2, at 325; Kincaid, supra
note 2, at 97; see also ALAN REED, ANGLO-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAw 376-77 (2003) ("When we refer to choice of law, we are addressing the
requirement of a policy selection process that, in multistate cases, necessitates a selection
amongst forum policies facilitating systemic and functional concerns as well as the primary
substantive issue of which party should prevail on the merits. In essence, the forum court
extrapolates practical, substantive and systemic values to implicate its law selection. The forum
court, operating as a repository of justice, caustically implements values into its decisions. The
aim of choice of law is to provide an intelligible and principled basis for choosing a substantive
rule in tort over the competing rule of another place.") (internal citations omitted). See generally

Harold G. Maier, Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at Choice ofLaw Conflict of
Laws, Foundationsand Future Directions, VAND. L. REV. 827 (1991); William A. Reppy, Jr.,

Eclecticism in Choice ofLaw: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 645 (1983).
9. See generally PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY ININTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (1999).
10. The parties' freedom to choose the governing law has been well accepted in European
countries as a basic principle in the conflict of laws relating to contracts. See Council (EC),

Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, at 15-16, No. C
282 (Dec. 10, 1980) (Mario Giuliano & Paul Lagarde) [hereinafter GIULIANO & LAGARDE
REPORT]; T.C. Hartley, Consumer ProtectionProvisions in the EEC Convention, in CONTRACT
CONFLICTS, THE E.E.C. CONVENTION ON THE LAw APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 111 (P.M. North ed., 1982) [hereinafter CONTRACT CONFLICTS]; Ole

Lando, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to ContractualObligations, 24 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 159, 169, 171-79 (1987). See generally C.G.J. Morse, The EEC Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 2 Y.B. EUR. L. 107 (1982); Patrick R. Williams,
The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to ContractualObligations,35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
1(1986).
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1990, which had adopted the earlier Rome Convention." The same
basic edifice remains in place, but a shift in emphasis has occurred
toward additional hard-and-fast overarching rules, with escape devices
appurtenant thereto within defined parameters. The background to these
initiatives, of course, is that legal disputes still arise, even in the context
of a meticulously negotiated contract, and resort is sought via the
litigation process, and a judge is consequently directed to resolve the
tensions within a specialized legal structure. This requires delineation of
the appropriate legal framework vis-a-vis the contractual issue at hand
and, in the absence of a governing law clause, primacy will apply to
teleological conflict of laws principles to prophylactically arbiter the
process. The essence of contract choice of law rules, akin to a litmus
paper test, is as an indicator of prevailing categorizations in which the
lex causae ought to be adopted beyond a basic iteration of the lex fori
qua governing law.12 In resolving this dilemmatic choice, a balance
needs to be struck between optimal policy desiderata focused around
certainty versus flexibility, and upholding individual party expectations
set against legitimate impacted state interests. A debt herein is owed to
the classical legal scholarship provided by Savigny 3 who, "developed a
system of a priori choice of law rules that assigned a legal relationship
to one particular legal order,"' 4 consequently facilitating a multilateral
rule-adoption template dependent upon the seat of the legal
relationship.'5 This methodology is prevalent in both the Second
Restatement and Rome I Regulation, which apply ob ective
factorization to identify the appropriate choice of law in contract.
The difficult choice that Anglo-American legal systems have
encountered in this arena has quintessentially revolved around the scylla
of party autonomy on one side of the scales, conflicting with state
regulatory controls or interests as the charybdis counterpoise factor. The
operative tension is at the fulcrum between the pragmatic benefits of
individual action to manage international contractual commitments,
conflating together with state reluctance to accede governance over
contractual interaction and impositions.'7 The challenge is whether
11. Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June
2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), art. 2, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6
(EU) [hereinafter Rome I].
12. See generally NYGH, infra note 31; Reimann, supra note 7.
13.

See 8 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS 34

38, 160-61 (1849).
14. Rihl, supra note 1, at 822 (emphasis added).
15.

SAVIGNY, supra note 13, at 160-61.

16. See infra text accompanying notes 222-26 & 450-54.
17. See Joost Blom, Choice ofLaw Methods in the PrivateInternationalLaw of Contract,
18 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 161, 162 (1980); Kincaid, supra note 2, at 94 ("[Ilt follows that when a
foreign law is chosen, it is because a court thinks that in the circumstances its own notions of
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private or public interest should control this legal battleground and
emerge victorious. Professor Hill,18 in line with other proponents,19 has
provided valedictory arguments for party autonomy: "(1) it enables the
parties to achieve predictability in an area where predictability is very
important; and (2) the 'necessary accommodation' between the interests
of 'trading states' will be achieved most fairly and effectively by
accepting the terms adopted by the parties." 20 In practice, of course,
party autonomy and individual choice is often linked to overweening
bargaining power on the part of one side of the agreement. A strong
presumption applies that their "home" law will be correspondingly
adopted, derived from their habitual residence. This devolves from a
clear predilection in favor of adoption of lex fori principles, and is
operative in the jurisdictional sphere as well as choice of law.2 1
Familiarity may breed contempt, but in this context it also provides
succour toward the facilitation of "local" laws.
A counterpoise to individual private interest in determining choice of
law issues in contracts concerns legitimate state principles which raise
inculcated optionality. 22 By way of illustration, consider the spatial
limitations effected by restrictive covenants as a by-product of a
managerial employment contract. The covenant may be rejected by the
employee's state law, but affirmed by the employer's state. A genuine
dispute, and selective choice, is consequentially raised beyond general
terms of reference for incorporated terms, and a veritable Pandora's Box
may be opened. Contractual enforcement may be rejected by a state on
justice between the parties will better be served by applying that foreign law. It is not chosen out
of any sense of duty to the foreign country.").
18. Alfred Hill, The JudicialFunction in Choice ofLaw, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1585 (1985).
19. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Contract Choice of Law in the Americas, 45 AM. J. COMP.
L. 195, 206-07 (1997); Ole Lando, New American Choice-of-Law Principlesand the European
Conflict ofLaws of Contracts, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 19, 34 (1982); Willis L. M. Reese, Choice of
Law in Torts and Contracts and Directionsfor the Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 2122 (1977).
20. Robert A. Sedler, Continuity, Precedent, and Choice of Law: A Reflective Response
to ProfessorHill, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 1419, 1423 (1992); see also Hill, supra note 18, 1622-23.
21. See Gruson, supranote 2, at 325.
22. See Bauerfield, supra note 2, at 1661; Kincaid, supra note 2, at 95:
The policy objective of choice of law rules as part of the private municipal law
of the forum is to do justice between the parties according to the values of the
forum, subject only to the public interests of the forum. If the parties to a
foreign contract have not exercised their freedom to choose, it is irrational and
inconsistent with that policy objective, and with the freedom to choose, to
apply a purely objective test. A rule needs to be developed (or the present rule
interpreted) so that a law is chosen in the absence of actual intention which
reflects primarily the joint interests of the parties at the time the contract was
made, only secondarily the interests of the forum state, and not at all the
interests of foreign states.
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the predicate that it would require a breach of the law of a foreign state.
A controversial schism may be created between competing indicators,
and acceding governance to straight-forward party autonomy over
choice of law, affects practical and theoretical difficulties.2 At a
European level, and as part of the progeny related to the conflicts choice
of law revolution in the United States, theoretical perspectives have
been more state determinative than via actual judicial precedent. 24 A
rule-selective methodology was embraced which was inherently policydriven, embodied by the writin s of Currie and the imprimatur of
governmental interest analysis. Primordial focus was attached to
deciphering states' legislatives policies to ensure coalescence with
juridical touchstones of the affected state. 2 6 The legal frictions between
social and private interests was addressed in this interpretative
fashion. 27 The deleterious impact, as addressed herein, concentrated
around a troublesome demotion for ordered private interests, and
corresponding uncertainty as case to case ad-hocery took hold.2 ' As
Bauerfield stated, "the cacophony of inconsistent theories in contract
conflicts of law has led to chaos, and out of concern for parties trying to
plan their legal relationships, autonomists hold that if the parties have
agreed in advance to a choice of law, that choice should usually be

honored." 2 9
At an early stage most of the countries of the European continent
rejected a rigid bright-line test, such as place of contracting or
performance and, instead, adopted the doctrine of party autonomy under
which the parties were free to choose the governing law, though
divergent views expressed on the question whether their freedom was
absolute or was restricted to the choice of a law with which the contract
23. See John Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of Contracts: A
Comparison ofEnglish andAmerican Approaches to the Conflict ofLaws, 58 CORNELL L. REV.
433, 436 (1973). See generally Robert A. Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement
(Second): An Analysis and a Critique,72 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (1972).
24. See Blom, supra note 17, at 197 ("Attempts to objectify the process, by finding the
country that is physically or factually most bound up with the contract, simply risk imposing a
solution that is inconsistent with the parties' interests, without going the whole way to a system
that actually considers what stake each country has in the application of its laws.").
25. See infra text accompanying notes 115-124.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Bauerfield, supra note 2, at 1662. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Contracts in the Conflict
of Laws, Part One: Validity, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1959); Louis C. James, The Effects
of the Autonomy of the Partieson the Validity of Conflict of Laws "Illegal Contracts"-Sunday,
Gambling, Lottery, and Other Arrangements, 8 AM. U. L. REV. 67, 76 (1959); Willis L. M.
Reese, Contractsand the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 531,
534 (1960). See generally Willis L. M. Reese, Power ofPartiesto Choose Law Governing Their
Contract,54 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 49 (1960).
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was factually connected. Interestingly, in the absence of a choice by
the parties, most of the countries adopted a flexible approach leaving
the judge to select the decisive connecting factors from the various
elements of the contract and the circumstances of the case." This
solipsistic determination has been swept away in recent times by the
maelstrom of European harmonization of private international law
principles; the Brussels and Lugano Convention templates for
jurisdiction and enforcement have been extended into the field of choice
of law via the effects of the implementation domestically of the Rome
Convention32 and continuation of the work on unification.

This

harmonization process has been further enhanced, and crystallized by
the direct effect given in 2009 to the Rome I Regulation 33 for contract,
and the Rome II Regulation for non-contractual obligations.3 4
In Part 2 of this Article there is a circumnavigation of the American
approaches to choice of law in contract: lex fori, multilateralism,
30. See Bauerfield, supra note 2, at 1661 n.10 (emphasis added).
The debate concerning the role that the parties' intentions should have in a
court's choice of law is a very old one. Professor Lorenzen traces the
autonomy rule to Dumoulin (1500-1566; French). Before his time, the views
of Bartolus (1314-1357; Italian) had generally been followed-that is, the law
of the place of contracting (lex loci contractus) governed natural
consequences of the contract, while the law of the place of performance
governed consequences arising subsequent to its formation. Dumoulin's
autonomy view was in turn replaced by the objective view of d'Argente (a
view similar to Bartolus's), which was in turn replaced by the autonomy
theory again during Pothier's time (1699-1772). Lorenzen, Validity and
Effects of Contracts in the Choice of Laws, 30 Yale L.J. 565, 573 (1921).
Professor Nussbaum credits the French jurist Molinaeus (1500-1566) with the
origination of the intent theory. Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts:
Cases versus Restatement, 51 Yale L.J. 893, 895 (1942).
Id.
31. See generally PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY ININTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 3-12 (1999).

32. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June, 19, 1980, 1605
U.N.T.S 79 [hereinafter Rome Convention]. The Convention was signed at that date by
Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. J. FAWCETT ET AL.,
CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 667-68 (14th ed., 2008) (In March and

December 1981 Denmark and the United Kingdom signed, others followed. Id The Convention
which finally came into force in the United Kingdom included three separate legal systems:
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Id. The Convention expressly provided that
each part of the United Kingdom were to be treated as a separate "country." Rome Convention,
supra note 32, art. 19(1). According to Article 19(2) of the Convention, and section 2(3) of the
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, an issue between a Scot and an English person was
subject to Convention provisions. Id. art. 19(1)-(2).
33. Rome I, supra note 11.
34. See generally ANDREw A. DICKINSON, THE ROME II REGULATION: THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (2008).
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unilateralism, the substantive law approach, and eclecticism. The
widespread support that now exists for the Second Restatement template
is evaluated in the context of these differing theoretical perspectives.35
The terms of the Second Restatement are evaluated in a comparative
manner and deconstructed in light of prevailing English doctrine laid
down in the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, and now the Rome I
Regulation. 36 It is submitted that differences are more apparent than
real. Pragmatism has prevailed over theoretical musings and rules
tinged with flexibility are the order of the day. This comparative
analysis is extended to quintessential determination of the import of
public policy in the contract spectrum.3 7
The traditional American academicians embraced rigid multilateral
principles, enshrining certainty and bright-line tests, derived from
spatial territory as a guiding touchstone and vested rights.38 Joseph
Beale, the reporter for the First Restatement on the Conflict of Laws,
adopted his guiding principles and axioms with, "the remorseless logic
of a civil law jurist."39 A chasm existed between Beale's classical
orthodoxy and the flexibility engendered by the modem realists with
their particularized jurisprudential beliefs.4o Beale's antediluvian views
held sway in articulating that to allow party autonomy was to permit the
parties to legislate themselves "outside the reach of the territorially
applicable law."4 1 Beale in vituperative language derided the principle
of party autonomy in choice of law as "absolutely anomalous,"
35. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2008: TwentySecond Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 279-80 (2009). There were thirty-three states
following either the Restatement or a combined modem approach, with only twelve following a
more traditional vested rights perspective. Id.
36. See generally Adrian Briggs, When in Rome, Choose as the Romans Choose, 125
L.Q.R. 191 (2009) (U.K.).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 253-301.
38. See generally Symeonides, supra note 4.
39. Lando, supra note 19, at 19; see also 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1079-84 (1935).

40. See Zhang, supra note 7, at 531 (internal footnotes omitted).
Beale's objection to party autonomy was based on the theory of vested rights,
which was also the foundation of the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
Beale believed that, "any obligation created by a given law attaches itself to
the person of the obligor and will be enforced by any State into which he
[travels or does business]." Thus to determine the law creating the obligation,
it is essential to locate the State where the last act necessary to bring the
obligation into existence occurred. Because of Beale's position, party
autonomy did not find its place in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
Id.
41. NYGH, supra note 31, at 10.
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"theoretically indefensible," and "absolutely impracticable." 42 As a
concomitant of this straitened ideological perspective the First
Restatement did not, therefore, acknowledge that the parties to an
international contract had any autonomy to depart from the basic rule
that the law of the place of contracting governed the contract. Foreign
law was only to be incorporated by the parties vis-a-vis the permissible
extent ordained by the lex loci contractus.43 This multilateralist rigid
rule-selection approach was swept away in the middle part of the
Twentieth Century by government interest analysis attached to Currie
and his progeny. Currie maintained that the policy behind each rule of
decision and the interest of the state whose rule of decision is at issue in
affecting that policy, should determine the rule's interstate or
international scope.4 Overarching importance is consequently attached
to state, rather than private interests, in the choice of law equation. 4 5
Despite entrenched jurisprudential standpoints, American legal
opinion and individual state approaches have, in general, moved toward
a liberalist view of party autonomy.4 6 A number of dissonant voices
remain, however, even today and a select group of U.S. states still apply
the lex loci contractus rule.4 7 As Juenger has cogently stated, this
appears a "remarkable anachronism in light of the fact that hard and fast
contract choice-of-law rules have gone out of style in the rest of the
world." 48 There is also a minor but diverse group of academicians who
reject autonomy. 49 These scholars embrace the governmental interest
methodology, centred around competing state interests above the
intention of the parties. "Currie, who was no less positivistic than Beale,
whom he derided, had his conflicts universe revolve around
governmental interests." 50 Primacy is accorded to state policy to govern
the agreement and not individual pre-ordered presumptions.51 Currie's
acolytes identify that an individual may be rule-selective in regard to
interpretation of a contract, but autonomy does not supplant overall
avoidance. 52 Furthermore, a sub-group advocates the "localization"
42. BEALE, supra note 39, at 1080, 1083-84.
43. See generally Reimann, supra note 7.
44. See generally BRAINERD

CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1963). Most of Currie's ideas are contained in a series of articles within this collection.
45. Id. at 590.
46. See Symeonides, supra note 35, at 279-80.
47. Juenger, supra note 19, at 198.
48. Id. at 198. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, The Internationalizationof Contractual
Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1995).

49. See Juenger, supra note 19, at 198.
50. Id. at 198.
51. See CURRIE, supra note 44, at 590.
52. See Sedler, supra note 20, at 1452-53. See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1986).
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approach by which party choice is only a factor in the balancing
equation, and when conflated with other factors on a plurality basis may
give one state a primordial interest.
A change in mindset supporting the freedom of the parties to choose
the applicable law may be traced back to the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,54 in which the
Court held that the choice of the parties in "a freely negotiated private
international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or
overweening bargaining power" should be determinative.5 5 Even though
the disputed issue in the case focused around the validity, or otherwise,
of a choice of jurisdiction clause, rather than choice of law in contract,
nonetheless the dicta provided in the majority opinion of Chief Justice
Burger identifies freedom of choice and inferential reference. 56 The
assimilated choice toward the London Court of Justice promoted
English choice of law over that of the United States. There is a
corresponding assumption that to protect the justifiable expectations of
the contracting parties it is essential to achieve choice of law principles
in contract which underscore uniformity of results, predictability and
certainty.5 As previously stated, the lodestar of contract conflicts has
steered toward party autonomy in fulfilment of these optimal goals. 59 As
Juenger has articulated, "traditional conflict of laws tenets, rooted as
they are in statism and positivism, seem out of tune with our times
when commercial practices are being freed from state interference. "66
There has been a beneficial promulgation of solutions to govern
international commercial transactions which satisfy commercial
efficiency and fulfil party expectations.61 The shift toward autonomy is
to be lauded as part of this process. Acceptance of the principle of
autonomy, subject to displacement provisions, is reflected in the
Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws, and American
53. See Bauerfield, supra note 2, at 1677-91.
54. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
55. Id. at 12.
56. See id. at 10-13.
57. See id at 11, 15; see also id at 20-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (commenting on the
risk, as he saw it, of evasion of American law).
58. See Kincaid, supra note 2, at 97; Willis L. M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the
Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 679 (1963); Zhang, supra note 7, at 533. See
generally Ernest G. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30
YALE L.J. 565 (1921).
59. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 215-18
(1993); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 857-62 (3d ed. 2000); Symeonides, supra

note 35, at 279-80; see also Morris J. Levin, Party Autonomy: Choice-of-Law Clauses in
Commercial Contracts, 46 GEO. L.J. 260,261 (1958).
60. Juenger, supra note 19, at 203.
61. See id.
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jurisprudence now overwhelmingly respects the choice of law made by

the parties.62
As Borchers has identified, the new supremacy of party autonomy
cases in the United States represents "the clearest triumph of pragmatics
over theory." 63 This is the refrain that now runs through AngloAmerican choice of law in contract and is highlighted throughout this
Article. In English law, until relatively recently, the theoretical ideology
that governed involved the search for the "proper law of the contract,"
which was a didactic exposition to enunciate the law governing many of
the matters affecting a contract. This sophisticated and flexible theory
was pragmatically swept away through statutory legislation contained in
The Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 and reflective amendments
contained within the Rome I Regulation, albeit that certain broad
similarities remain.65 By the common law theory of "proper law" the
parties could choose the proper law, with limited impositions curtailing
this privilege. 66 If the parties did not express a choice, and one could not
be inferred by the courts, an objective test was applied. The impact
was to localize the contract by looking for the system of law with which
the transaction was most closely connected68 This all encompassing test
has been revivified as the default position within the purview of the
Rome I Regulation.69 A dual combination of theories underpinned the
proper law test: subjective analysis prevailed which looked to parties'
intentions; and objectivity was secondary in seeking to localize the
contract in the absence of express choice. As adumbrated herein, it is
party autonomy which fulfils optimal policy goals, and has the
62. See Borchers,supra note 48, at 421; Symeonides, supranote 35, at 279-80.
63. Patrick J. Borchers, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 1992: Observations and
Reflections, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 135 (1994).
64. See DAVID MCCLEAN & KISCH BEEVERS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 351-55 (7th ed.
2009); P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
533-35 (13th ed. 1999).
65. See generally CONTRACT CONFLICTS, supra note 10; IAN F. FLETCHER, CONFLICT OF
LAWS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 147-79 (1982); JONATHAN HILL, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES chs. 14 & 15 (2d ed. 1998); PETER KAYE, THE NEW PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CONTRACT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993); DOMINICK LASOK &
PETER A. STONE, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 340-87 (1987); RICHARD
PLENDER, THE EUROPEAN CONTRACTS CONVENTION-THE ROME CONVENTION ON THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (1991).
66. See generally NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROGRAMS IN COMMON-LAW
JURISDICTIONS, infra note 80.

67. See generally id.
68. See generally id.
69. See Briggs, supra note 36, at 192.
70. See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 193-95 (2d Cir. 1955); see

also Patrick J. Borchers, Professor Brilmayer and the Holy Grail, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 465, 47376(1991).
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pragmatic virtues of simplifyinW the judicial task according to the
parties' reasonable expectations. In light of these adventitious benefits
it is hardly surprising that courts of all conflict stripes have, in recent
times, embraced the Second Restatement's broad endorsement of party
autonomy in section 187.
The third part of this Article, in a comparative framework, provides
a detailed extirpation of English choice of law principles in contract set
against the American experience. It is significant that they have been
developed over the duration of the last two decades with seismic
changes in ordering, and to ensure compotation with essential goals of
unification and harmonization at a European level. By way of contrast
to the more recent assimilation of party autonomy in the United States,
there has been a long-standing propagation in Europe of liberal
positivism acceding to private individuals the power to select the law
they wish, and in the absence of such choice, utilization of flexible
rather than rigid multilateral connecting indicators. 72 This supremacy
right has, as Nygh identifies, enjoyed a rich legal history. It can be
traced to Dumoulin, as far back as the seventeenth century, who
propounded not simply the conceptual edifice of party autonomy, but
more generally the enshrined ideal of a pactum tacitum, taking
precedence in the event that individuals did not deploy their control to
designate the applicable law.74 In an English setting, Lord Mansfield
heralded similar inculcated policy determinants around pre-eminence to
the law of the state with a view to which the contract was made.7 ' At an
early stage in development, both in England and on the continent, the
foundation stones were laid for embracing party autonomy as the
fundamental choice of law principle. The development of the European
Union, and promotion of harmonized ideals, acted as a catalyst in
modem times for the promotion of regional integration. The successful
codification of international rules of civil procedure in the Brussels
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters acted as a precursor to subsequent reappraisal
of choice of law. A degree of collinearity already existed between
Member States in this regard, and because of the commercial
importance of the subject matter there were clarion calls for uniformity.
These voices were heeded with the production of the Rome Convention
71. See generally Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revised: A Statutory Solution to a
Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471 (1989).
72. See generally Bauerfield, supra,note 2.
73. See generally id.; NYGH, supra note 31.
74. See generallyNYGH, supra note 31.
75. See Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 1078 (1760) (Eng.) ("The law of the place can
never be the rule, where the transaction is entered into with an express view to the law of
another country, as the rule by which it is to be governed.").
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1980 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, which came
into force in England on April 1, 1991, via the implementation of the
Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990,76 and subsequently the Rome I
Regulation effective from December 17, 2009.n
In Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation there is express recognition of
the principle of party autonomy, except as regards certain agreements
between parties of disparate bargaining power, for example, consumer
and employment contracts.7 8 In the absence of a valid selection of an
express or implied fashion then an imputed choice derives from
Article 4. The new derivation provided by Article 4 establishes a variety
of presumptive hard and fast rules for eight different varieties of
contract, but tinged with flexibility akin to the Second Restatement
referring to the law of the country with which the contract is "most
closely connected." 7 9 This in turn mirrors the deployment of the English
"proper law" concept. The essence of the hard and fast rule
compartmentalization is predicated on examination of the place where
the "characteristic" service or performance was rendered: this is
reflective of the true seat of the contract and this ascertained law is
presumptively applicable to governance.8 0 The doctrine itself originated
in Switzerland which has also long been a proponent of the "closest
connection" test.8 1 The merits, or otherwise, of this governing test are
explored more fully in Part 3 of this Article. Opponents of the
"characteristic performance" test, extended further by the explicit
provisions in Article 4(1)(a)-(h) of the Rome Regulation I, have
expressed their views splenetically and intemperately: "it down-grades
the importance of the law of the party who pays for the supply of goods
and services, and creates the 'prestigious disappearance' in this context
of the money obligation; it is too narrow to cover many types of
contract
involving mutual obligations of confidence
and

76. MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 64, at 354.

77. Id. at 355-59.
78. See generally Georges R. Delaume, The European Convention on the Law Applicable
to ContractualObligations: Why a Convention?, 22 VA. J. INT. L. 105 (1981) (noting the effect
of the Rome Convention provisions in Article 6 (consumer contracts) and Article 8 (individual
employment contracts). These provisions do not invalidate choice of law clauses: they merely
provide that such clauses cannot deprive weaker parties of the protection that their habitual
residence law asserts (consumers) or the otherwise applicable law (employees) provide).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 510-516.
80. For critical discussion in the context of an earlier draft see Hans Ulrich Jessurun
D'Oliveira, "CharacteristicObligation" in the Draft EEC Obligation Convention, 25 AM. J.
COMP. L. 303 (1977). See generally PETER NORTH, ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 2351 (1993); PETER NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS IN COMMON LAW

JURISDICTIONS (Martinus Nijhoff 1993).
81. See generally Delaume, supra note 78.
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collaboration." 82 It is submitted, however, that perceived demerits are
more apparent than real, and outweighed by the clear adventitious
benefits of the overall presumption. The revisions promulgated in the
Rome I Regulation support the arguments set out in this Article around
the importance of commercial efficiency and business efficacy as
guidepoints to effective choice of law in contract. The attainment of
optimal goals have beneficially been supported and advanced through
the "characteristic performance" test. The greater degree of certainty,
predictability and uniformity in outcome determination that has been
activated should be recognized. There has been an improvement on the
English common law rules for determining the proper law in the
absence of choice:
If then the search is for the law suitable for jus dispositivum, and
it is accepted that what is required is a fixed rule pointing with
certainty to a particular law, that this law should be that of one of
the parties, that sometimes there may not be much reason for
preferring the law of one party rather than the other, and finally
that the parties are free to exclude the normal rule by making a
choice for themselves, it would seem that a rule indicating the
law of the party who is to render the characteristic performance
has much to commend it. At any rate ... such a rule is superior to
the weighing of factors under the vague formula of the law of the
country or legal system with which the contract is most closely
connected.
An important synergy exists over Anglo-American jurisprudential
considerations relating to public policy overriding mandatory provisions
qua lex fori. This collinearity is considered subsequently. By section
187 of the Second Restatement there is a public policy displacement
criterion where, "application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue . . . ."84 This is mirrored in the re-drafted Rome I

82. Lawrence Collins, PracticalImplications in England of the E.E.C. Convention on the
Law Applicable to ContractualObligations, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 209.

83. Anthony J.E. Jaffey, The English Proper Law Doctrine and the EEC Convention, 33
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 531, 550 (1984). See generally Ronald H. Graveson, PhilosophicalAspects
of the English Conflict of Laws, 78 L.Q.R. 337 (1962) (U.K.); Anthony J.E. Jaffey, The
FoundationsofRules for the Choice ofLaw, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 368 (1982).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §187(2)(b) (1971) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ] . See generally Alan D. Weinberger, PartyAutonomy and

Choice-of-Law: The Restatement (Second), Interest Analysis, and the Search for a
Methodological Synthesis, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 605 (1976).
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Regulation to which functional coalescence is now prevalent.8 ' A key
provision of the Rome I Regulation, enshrined within Article 3 and
Article 9 of the new provisions, is a recognition that certain rules of
law- so-called mandatory rules-represent a particularly strong public
policy agenda that deserve application notwithstanding the parties'
choice of law or normally applicable choice of law rules. In effect, the
universalist concept of "norms of immediate application" or, to use the
preferred French expression, "lois de police," were incorporated into the
Rome Convention, and latterly the Rome I Regulation, to modify its
multilateral rules and those on party autonomy.8 6 This limitation,
however, is constrained in nature and by particularized design. The
definition of overriding mandatory rules contained in Article 9(1) of the
Rome I Regulation requires that they be, "provisions the respect for
which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public
interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation." 87
Although Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention rule is applicable to all
mandatory rules, Article 9(3) of the Regulation is only applicable to
mandatory provisions of foreign law that render the performance of the
contract "unlawful."8 The mandatory rules are also meritoriously
deployed to protect the weaker party from a socioeconomic perspective
in discrete types of contract, specifically consumer and employment
contracts.
In the concluding part of this Article there is a focus on optimal
Anglo-American policy goals for choice of law in contract set in the
context of extant law. The new provisions in the Rome I Regulation are
deconstructed, and interpretative critique is propounded, derived from
considerations of business efficacy and commercial efficiency. It is vital
to highlight directly the overriding substantive concerns in contract
conflict cases-the reasonable expectations of the parties and upholding

85. See generally Juenger,supra note 19.
86. See generally Adeline Chong, The Public Policy and Mandatory Rules of Third
Countries in International Contracts, 2 J. PIV. INT'L L. 27 (2006); Michael Hellner, Third
Country Overriding MandatoryRules in the Rome I Regulation: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 5 J.
PRIV. INT'L L. 447 (2009).

87. Rom I, supra note 11, art. 9(1).
88. See Hellner, supra note 86, at 461 ("What, then, is the meaning of 'unlawful'? Does
that include any rule that renders the contract, or a particular clause thereof, void or
unenforceable or that would otherwise modify it - or is the concept restricted to rules that
involve some form of criminal punishment if performance is carried out? It is submitted that the
concept of unlawfulness must be understood in the wider sense."). See generally Andrew
Dickinson, Third Country Mandatory Rules in the Law Applicable to ContractualObligations:
So Long, Farewell,Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu?, 3 J. Pluv. INT'L L. 53 (2007); Trevor C. Hartley,
MandatoryRules in InternationalContracts: The Common Law Approach, 266 HAGUE RECUEIL
DES COURS 337 (1977).
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of legitimate presumptions.89 In this respect a dissonance exists from the
usual situation in alternative civil claims, wherein individuals
commonly act without first having given thought to the possible
consequences of their actions. 90 For contract cases, efficacious rules are
needed at the very outset for the vital component of assisting the parties
in shaping their commercial transactions.9 1
It is submitted that a notable feature of this arena is the degree of
replication that now applies to applicable law selection on both sides of
the Atlantic. There is a broad consensus in ideological perspective
between the Second Restatement and the new Rome I Regulation for
contract choice of law, but outside this general fortuitous meshing
together of governing principles there remains limited state anomalies in
treatment of choice of law, still wedded to place of contracting or sole
interest analysis guidance. 2 The accord that prevails is still remarkable
given the divergencies in other branches of private international law,
specifically over in personamjurisdiction, recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments, and tort choice of law. 93 A mid-way path has been
charted, as Reimann has cogently asserted, between hard and fast rules
of orthodoxy and flexibility, derived from a closest connection "escape"
device:
The methodological compromise underlying the current
American-European approach helps to explain why it became
common ground: it is a solution that provides enough
predictability and generality to satisfy the more traditional and
rule-bound Europeans, and it proffers sufficient flexibility and
regard for particular circumstances to appeal to the more
freewheeling and case-oriented Americans. Put positively, it
combines the best of both worlds; put negatively, it is a
compromise with which both sides can live.9 4
Both the Rome I Regulation and the Second Restatement deploy a
brand of hybrid eclecticism dependent on twin sets of objectivity and
subjectivity. Party autonomy will prevail unless supplanted by
overriding state interest concerns. Rebuttable presumptions to aid
selection of applicable law dominate the judicial landscape. These
89. See Patrick Borchers, New York Choice of Law: Weaving the Tangled Strands, 57
ALB. L. REv. 93, 111 (1993). See generallyJUENGER, supra note 59; Reese, supra note 19.
90. See generally Morse, supra note 3.
91. See Reese, supra note 19, at 39.
92. See Symeonides, supra note 35, at 280 (highlighting that by year 2008 there were still
12 states following the antediluvian traditional vested rights approach to contract choice of law
and 5 states adopting a significant contacts perspective).
93. See REED, supra note 8, at 285-574.
94. Reimann, supra note 7, at 592.
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presumptions may be overridden through a localizing test that deploys
certain features of interest analysis and proper law, two theoretical
methodologies that have enervated our private international law
discussions for a considerable duration.
II. THE AMERICAN POSITION

A. TraditionalChoice ofLaw Theory
In the United States a legal prism exists whereby the laws of
individual states are separated into dissonant compartments, and as such
a fertile landscape has been created for expert critique by leading
commentators. A new choice of law methodology has been constructed
that reflects a more liberal and enlightened template, and has shifted
from a positivistic straightjacket toward hybrid eclecticism. 9 5 This
eclectic approach has bedded together co-terminous policy concerns
relating to certainty and business efficacy, and whilst it affirms
legitimate expectations it also allows an appropriate degree of flexibility
at the margins. This particular section charts the significant
developments that have occurred in this arena, and sets a contextual
base for the recent European initiatives in the Rome I Regulation.
The orthodox vested rights rule contained in the First Restatement,
attributable to Joseph Beale, enshrined that the validity and effect of an
agreement was to be governed by the law of the place of making of that
contract. 96 This primary rule was supported by an adjunct provision that
a particularized issue on contractual performance could be subjected to
the law of the place of performance. Party autonomy was subjugated,
and consequently disregarded, as a qualifying connecting factor, and
Beale articulated that the applicable law was designated a matter of state
sovereignty and, thus, beyond the reach of private individuals.9 8
The bright-line mechanistic test that prevailed in the First
Restatement is reflective of a multilateral approach toward contract
choice of law. 99 It deploys 'jurisdiction-selecting" principles between
95. See generally Blom, supra note 17.
96. See Prebble,supra note 23, at 440. See generally BEALE, supra note 39.
97. See generally Ian F. G. Baxter, InternationalBusiness and Choice ofLaw, 36 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 92 (1987); Christopher L. Ingrim, Choice-of-Lav Clauses: Their Effect on
ExtraterritorialAnalysis - A Scholar's Dream, A Practitioner'sNightmare, 28 CREIGHT4ON L.
REV. 663 (1995).
98. BEALE, supra note 39, at 1079-84. See generally Mathias Reinann, Parochialismin
American Conflicts Law, 49 AM. J. CoMP. L. 369 (2001); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of
Choice ofLaw: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2248 (1999).
99. See generally Friedrich K. Juenger, American Conflicts Scholarshipand the New Law
Merchant, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 487 (1995).
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the contract and the impacted legal system through the medium of a
prescribed connecting factor.' 0 The purposive intent behind such a
prescription is to achieve a uniformity in outcome, irrespective of the
provenance of the judicial forum.' 0 ' A consequential by-product of this
strategy is avoidance of the perceived ills attendant to forum shopping,
and the putative search for beneficial venue resolution.102 A spatial
touchstone underpins this inculcated ideological perspective in that it
aligns choice of law resolution to the territorial reach of a legally
significant act.'0 3
The deontological reasoning attendant to a totally multilateralist
rationale, as espoused in the First Restatement, drew vituperative
criticism from a number of academicians, notably Cook' 04 who derived
succour from earlier difficulties postulated by Lorenzen. 0 5 The place of
contractual undertaking may be a fortuitous lottery with no conscious
formulation by the parties of specific design, and as such, the applicable
law that is determinative only has a flimsy link to the legal system
ascribed. In difficult cases it proved troublesome to delineate whether
an issue impacted on a matter of performance or of validity and effect.
In order to avoid egregious determinations that seemed counterintuitive, and in similar vein to problems associated with a bright-line
mechanistic test for tortious claims dependent purely on a lex loci delicti
rule, escape devices were adapted to avoid a rigid vested rights test.' 0 6
100.

See DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESs 65 (1966). See generally

Friedrich K. Juenger, The Need for a ComparativeApproach to Choice-of-Law Problems, 73
TUL. L. REV. 1309 (1999).
101. See generally SAVIGNY, supranote 13.
102. See JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 35 (3d ed. 1997); PIERRE
MAYER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVi 56 (5th ed. 1994); Alan Reed, To be or Not to be: The

Forum Non Conveniens Performance Acted Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stages, 29 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 125 (2000). See generally Ronald A. Brand, Uni-State Lawyers and
MultinationalPractice:Dealing with International,Transnational,and Foreign Law, 34 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1135 (2001).

103. See BEALE, supra note 39, at 1090-91.
104. Walter Wheeler Cook, 'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws, 31 U. ILL. L. REV. 143,
178 (1936); Walter Wheeler Cook, 'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws: 'Intention' of the
Parties, 32 U. ILL. L. REV. 899, 920 (1938). See generally Joost Blom, Choice of Law Methods
in the Private InternationalLaw of Contract, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 206 (1979).
105. See generally Lorenzen, supra note 58. Note in terms of validity of a contract,
Lorenzen espoused a focus upon an examination of where the agreement had a reasonable
connection, and accorded with Beale that party intentions were not truly determinative. Id. at
658, 672. See generally Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IOWA L. REV. 399,
411 n.30 (1968).
106. See Jonathan Harris, Choice of Law in Tort-Blending in with the Landscape of the
Conflict of Laws?, 61 MOD. L. REV. 33, 46-47 (1998). See generally Prebble, supra note 23.
Note that on a number of occasions, U.S. courts presented with unfortunate consequences
attached to rigid deployment of the lex loci contractus principle deployed escape and
characterization devices as a side-stepping exercise in judicial sophistry. See, e.g., Louis-
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These escape mechanisms embraced novel characterization of issues as
pertaining to a different legal connecting factor such as a contract or
tort dispute reclassified as a family law matter,' o through the utilization
of renvoi10 8 techniques, or as in English law reformulation via
substantive issues identified as procedural incantations thereby
governed by the lex fori.109
The vested rights test ascribed to Beale and the First Restatement has
been over-taken by subsequent developments, and the ascerbic attack by
many commentators has downplayed its import." 0 However, as
Symeonides has cogently identified, it still holds sway in a limited
number of U.S. states.'" These states are wedded to the benefits of a
bright-line place of contracting test which is simple to apply, enjoys the
attraction of certainty, and in a multiplicity of cases the law of the place
of contracting is self-evidently the correct law to judge contractual
validity.112 It is suggested that this perceived simplicity in application
has ensured the vestigial survival of the doctrine.I
B. The American New-Thinkers
It follows, therefore, that the normative reach of legal rules i.e.,
their spatial, temporal, subject-matter and personal scope of
coverage, is a function of their underlying social policies.... The
functional methodology enthusiasts contemptuously reject the
traditional, mechanistic choice of law system with its "neutral"
jurisdiction-selecting connecting factors and its blind unconcern
for the underlying social purposes of the substantive legal rules
potentially applicable."14

Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, 43 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1930) (redefining vital concept); Milliken
v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1877) (refocusing last act doctrine); Univ. of Chi. v. Dater, 270 N.W.
175 (Mich. 1936) (applying renvoi).
107. See generally Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955); Balts v. Balts, 142 N.W.2d
66 (Minn. 1966); Pierce v. Heiz, 314 N.Y.S.2d 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
108. See generally Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962); In re Schneider's Estate,
96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1950).
109. See generally Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526 (196 1); C. G. J. Morse, Choice ofLaw in Tort: A Comparative
Survey, 32 AM. J. CoMP. L. 51 (1984).
110. Supra notes 104-05.
Ill. Symeonides, supra note 35, at 279. It still predominates in the states of Alabama,
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
112. See generally Blom, supra note 104.
113. Id.at232,234.
114. Amos Shapira, "Grasp All, Lose All": On Restraint and Moderation in the
Reformulation of Choice ofLaw Policy, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 248, 254 (1977).
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Forum-orientated approaches to choice of law, principally Brainerd
Currie's governmental interest analysis methodology,' 1 5 revolutionized
the American private international law landscape; new colours altered
Beale's vested rights formulaic template." 6 This changed kaleidoscope,
a brand of unilateralism, focused upon the purposive spatial intent of
the potentially applicable foreign or domestic legal rules, set in the
specific context of their determinative case law or legislative
provisions.1 17 No longer was the spotlight on a simplistic and
mechanistic connecting factor to a single legal system." As Lando has
stated, "Currie was chiefly interested in what he called true
conflicts."' 19
The essence of a "true conflict" is when the laws of two or more
potentially impacted states collide, and each of them has a governmental
interest in the adoption of their applicable law.120 The outcome is
facilitated through a scrutiny into the teleological purposes behind the
veils of state law, through purposive interpretation of legitimate intent,
and via this heightened process a construction of which law would be
most advanced through governing application.121 By contrast, a "false
conflict" accrues where only one of the legal systems has a
governmental interest at play, and the other is vacant. 22 In "true
115. See generally CURRIE, supra note 44 (outlining Currie's theory of Governmental
Interest Analysis).
116. See Juenger,supra note 100, at 1313-14.
117. See id. at 1316-17.
118. See id.
119. Lando, supra note 19, at 24.
120. See William L. Richman, Diagramming Conflicts: A Graphic Understanding on
Interest Analysis, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 317, 320 (1982). See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).

121. See Harold G. Maier, Finding the Trees in Spite of the Metaphorist: The Problem of
State Interests in Choice ofLaw, 56 ALB L. REv. 753,766 (1993).
[Interest analysis] encourages choice of law decisions having two
characteristics. First, the result reached by the forum court must not adversely
affect the interstate or international systems; second, the result must not be one
that would disadvantage the forum state if, in a later mirror image case, some
foreign forum arrived at a result similar to the one reached by the forum in the
case at bar. Once both these tests are met, the issue of governmental interests is
resolved and the forum state may select as it wishes within these two
parameters.
Id. (alteration to original).
122. See Richman, supra note 120, at 319. See generally Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law:
Interest Analysis and Its "New Crits, " 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 681 (1988); Robert A. Sedler,
Reflections on Conflict-of-Laws Methodology, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1628 (1981); Russell J.
Weintraub, A Defence ofInterestAnalysis in the Conflict ofLaws and the Use of that Analysis in
ProductsLiability Cases, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 493 (1985).
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conflict" cases, with competing policies to be advanced, then Currie's
effectual tie-breaker would be to give supererogatory effect to the law
of the forum, qua lexfori.123 This interpretation was pre-dominant, both
in the scenario where the competing laws centred around the
forum/foreign law or even where the dispute engaged separate foreign
legal systems, with no impacted forum interests.
Governmental interest analysis in choice of law, for contract and
tort, developed incrementally and solipsistically through ad-hoc judicial
precedents. 25 It was, however, the New York Court of Appeals which
was central in the distillation of an innovative edifice of judicial
construction and exterior creativity. A trio of significant cases in
contract choice of law were reflective of this new juridical revolution.126
The methodology advanced in Auten v. Auten reflected an important
demarcation beyond the mechanistic austerity of the First Restatement
and Beale's deontological reasoning. A husband and wife had separated,
the wife living with the children from the marriage in England, and the
erstwhile husband remaining in New York. 127 At issue, was whether the
separation agreement had been invalidated in light of the changed
locality of residence.' 8 The New York Court of Appeals refused to
apply a simple place of contracting rule but determined that the
applicable law was English as the agreement had the "most significant
contacts" therein.129 It was identified that England had primary interests
to prescribe and govern pursuant obligations under the agreement in the
context of the continuing residency of the wife and children.1 30
123. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict ofLaws: A Critique ofInterestAnalysis, 32 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 10 (1984).
124. See id. The principal feature of Currie's approach involves the primacy attached to
forum law. "He believed that the lexfori always had a claim to application because 'normally,
even in cases involving foreign elements, the court should be expected, as a matter of course, to
apply the rule of decision found in the law of the forum.' Accordingly, local law can be applied
even if there is no forum interest to vindicate. A court is required to analyze foreign policies and
interests only if the parties raise the foreign law issue. But even then analysis begins at home
and is likely to end where it began, because if the forum has no 'legitimate interest' it probably
cannot take jurisdiction in the first place." Id. See generally Brainerd Currie, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233
(1963).
125. See generally Kegel, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 615 (1979); Fawcett, 31 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
169 (1982).
126. See generally Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y.
1969); Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1961); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y.
1954).
127. Auten, 124 N.E.2d at 100.
128. Id. at 101.
129. Id at 101-02.
130. Id. at 103-04. Significantly, the primary issue focused upon English public policy
concerns notably that it would conflict with such principles for a matrimonial separation
agreement to bar either spouse from a judicial avenue; the spotlight was not simply on risk-
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Moreover, Judge Fuld asserted that pre-eminent interests applied to
English law with reference to a "center of gravity" or "grouping of
contacts" approach, and in the light of the competing values engaged
this reflected the purposive intent of the parties and facilitated "the best
practical result."112
A unilateralist3 2 extirpation was also adopted in Haag v. Barnes, 133
which mirrored the Auten decision in terms of promulgating a centre of
gravity critique. A contractual agreement effected in Illinois stipulated
that the father, also based in Illinois, would pay maintenance support for
his illegitimate child.134 An express term of the agreement stated that
Illinois law was to apply, even though mother and child were residents
of New York.135 The court, refusing simply to look at place of
contracting, considered de novo the focal centre of gravity of the
agreement, and reviewed the issue in light also of a "contact-counting"
test.'3 6 This analysis led to an adoption of Illinois law as the applicable
law via weightier contacts in general, and a focal epicentre
touchstone. 3 7
New policy goals were at play in Haag, incorporating enhanced
flexibility and greater ad-hoc judicial interpretation. This was reflected
in the last case of the trilogy, the decision in IntercontinentalPlanning,
Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., where a contractual dispute was decided by the
New York Court of Appeals on a unilateralist basis.138 The action
involved an oral contract, with a claim brought by a New York broker
for a finder's fee in setting up a corporate purchase for a New Jersey
client.'3 9 The oral nature of this agreement made it unenforceable under
New York's statute of frauds, but it was enforceable under New Jersey
law.140 Ultimately, after the court subjected the action to a policydeterminative and rule-selective analysis, it was held that New York law
fixing vis-d-vis contractual repudiation. Id.
131. Id. at 101-02 (internal quotations omitted).
132. The ethos purveyed by unilateralism, ad hoc in nature, is anathema to desiderata of
uniformity and certainty in outcome. To a unilateralist the fundamental inquiry is to spatial
reach of rules; she should consider whether the case at hand is one that is apposite for that
particular law to be supererogatory. See generally Juenger, supra note 99; Arthur Taylor von
Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROs. 27 (1977);
Gene R. Shreve, Teaching Conflicts, Improving the Odds, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1672 (1992); Aaron
D. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania Method, 9
DUQ. L. REv. 373 (1971).
133. 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961).
134. See id. at 442.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 444.
137. See generally Blom, supra note 104.
138. Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 576 (N.Y. 1969).
139. Id. at 577.
140. Id. at 580.
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applied even though it disadvantaged a home plaintiff.'4 1 A teleological
and purposive interpretation of the statutory provisions, in the mystical
context of governmental interest analysis techniques, revealed that
forum law was intended to be sui generis to protect customers of New
York brokers, and was reflective of the state interest in protecting the
overall brokerage system. The focal epicentre of the dealings transpired
in New York, and not in New Jersey, which was a vital ingredient in
embracing forum law as the applicable law.' 42
In essence, the governmental interest that the rule-selective theories
are solicitous of safeguarding is a state's interest in seeing that socially
undesirable anomalies are not affected by imposing another state's law
to persons or activities that are part of its own social or economic
system. A number of common charges have been levelled against such a
formula. 143 The prevailing criticism of the ideological doctrine has
centred on concerns whether it is possible to consistently determine the
intended reach of substantive legal rules and indeed whether the attempt
to ascertain competing state policies is, in reality, a wasteful exercise of
sheer sophistry. On this issue Maier has stated that, "[1]egislative intent
comes as close as possible to an analogue to the self-perception of a
single sentient being."1 44
Another concern relates to whether unilateralism's inherent
flexibility addresses the necessary structure and stability in a choice of

law approach.14 5 Brilmayerl 46 and Juenger,14 7 amongst other leading
commentators, have seriously questioned whether interest analysis is
simply an open door to local favoritism and forum shopping in choice
of law.148 A recurring theme here is that the fundamental assumption of
141. Id. at 584.
142. For a primary illustration of forum preference, see Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d
543 (1964), and see Robert A. Christensen, Recent Development, Oregon Adopts Governmental
Interest Approach to Choice ofLaw, 17 STAN. L. REV. 750 (1965).
143. For general attacks on the choice of law revolution, see Lea Brilmayer, Interest
Analysis and the Myth ofLegislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392 (1980); John H. Ely, Choice
of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981);
Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 772 (1983);
Willis L. M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972); and
Twerski, supra note 132.
144. Maier, supra note 121, at 759.
145. Juenger has stated that: "[n]either litigants nor the administration of justice stand to
gain if state supreme courts adopt Ambrose Bierce's definition of an appeal, i.e., putting the
'dice into the box for another throw."' Juenger, supra note 123, at 42.
146. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without
Foundations,46 OHIO ST L.J. 459 (1985).
147. Juenger, supra note 123, at 26.
148. For conflicting academic views defending Currie, see generally Posnak, supra note
122; Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A
Response to the 'New Critics, '34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983); Louise Weinberg, On Departing
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governmental interest analysis, the articulation that choice of law
conclusions can effectively have their derivation from extrapolating
policies behind substantive rules, falls by the wayside when subjected to
strict scrutiny. The methodology is stigmatized as a mere adoption of
antirule homilies. 149 It is suggested that the propagation of state interests
as a value determination indicator has the unfortunate consequence of
deleteriously marginalizing legitimate party interests over applicable
choice of law. Party autonomy is relegated by a brand of particularistic
judicial intuitionism. Governmental interest analysis purveyed by Currie
and his progeny, when applied to contract rather than to tort, may
disenfranchise the objectives of predictability and protection of party
expectations that were identified in the introductory part as optimal
goals in contractual resolutions.s 0
The difficulty, of course, of adoption of governmental interest
analysis in the contractual arena are even more manifest in the
international rather than the intrastate sphere. In the case of a
commercial contract between London and New York businessmen,
separately advised by independent lawyers, it is difficult to countenance
superior influence being attached to state rather than private concerns.
Shapira, in this context, has correctly derided what he saw to be the
"irresistible urge" of many interest analysts to "impute to virtually every
legal norm some underlying concrete social or political purpose.", 5 He
added his imprimatur to prevailing criticism by concluding:
The intellectual premise of such a process may become rather
shaky as one encounters legal rules whose supporting policy
goals are obscure, cumulative, or even contradictory. In the
absence of reliable information as to the intended policy function
of the legal norm in question, the process may readily degenerate
into a speculative postulation, or even fabrication, of putative
underlying policies, solely on the ground of their assumed
plausibility. 2
Currie's ideology153 was adapted and revised by a number of
from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REv. 595 (1984).
149. See generally David F. Cavers et al., Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV.
551 (1968).
150. See generally Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277
(1990).
151. Shapira, supra note 114, at 262.
152. Id.
153. See BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on the Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177 (1963). Despite the fact that Currie, in later

writings, straitened his methodological focus vis-6-vis ascribing legislative policies a moderate
and restrained interpretation, nevertheless he did not demur from the quintessential standpoint
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American new-thinkers who have had a significant impact on the
Anglo-American legal topographical map in private international law.
Their work has had a profound influence on the Second Restatement
and some features are addressed in the Rome I Regulation.1 54 Cavers, in
his later writings, looked beyond the iteration of social policy behind
domestic laws in question and particularized resonances of state
engagements which may be impacted in dispute resolutions.' 5 5 In terms
of novel policy, Cavers adopted a twin pillar system of preferential rules
to govern contractual matters.156 First, was a rule protecting the weaker
party against the adverse consequences of unequal bargaining power
when such protection was potentially permissible by a law having a
specific connection with the transactional agreement.' 5 7 This was
subsequently applied at a European level in the Rome Convention 1980,
and forms a central part of the Rome I Regulation, with special
The second pillar
preferences for consumers and employees.'
promul ated a rule affirming the principle of party autonomy for other
cases.l As such, Cavers disavowed a rule-selective methodology
which failed to accord significance to impacted connecting factors, and
basically selected the substantive rule that best fits modern standards of
commercial efficiency and appropriate juridical precepts.16 These
principles, yet again, are mirrored in the new Rome I Regulation, and lie
at the cornerstone of Article 4 selective choice of law principles.161
An alternative mechanism of dealing with choice of law, still
adopted in a number of U.S. states, involves the substantive law
that the facilitation of state legislative interests, and their corresponding promulgation, formed
the cornerstone of an iterative choice of law process. See generally id at 184-85.
154. See generally Blom, supra note 104.
155. See generally CAVERS, supra note 100.
156. See generally id.
157. See generally id.
158. See generally Delaume, supra note 78.
159. See generally CAVERS, supra note 100.
160. See id. at 181.
Where, for the purpose of providing protection from the adverse consequences
of incompetence, heedlessness, ignorance, or unequal bargaining power, the
law of a state has imposed restrictions on the power to contract or to convey or
encumber property, its protective provisions should be applied against a party
to the restricted transaction where (a) the person protected has a home in the
state (if the law's purpose were to protect the person) and (b) the affected
transaction or protected property interest were centred there or, (c) if it were
not, this was due to facts that were fortuitous or had been manipulated to evade
the protective law.
Id.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 438-49.
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perspective, which may be viewed as focusing upon commonalities
rather than differences. 62 A number of notable jurists such as Leflar,
Reese and Weintraubl 63 have asserted that among choice-influencing
indicators a court should evaluate is that rule of a particular system of
laws, among several which may be competing for application, which is
"in tune with the times"l64 or, as Leflar asserts, is the "better rule of
law."l 65 He has affirmed that courts ought to resolve choice of law
disputes by reference to five "choice-influencing considerations."' 66
The first four considerations mirror the relevant factors embraced by the
Second Restatement which is considered further below, but the fifth
factor is a novel departure that focuses on the "better rule of law."1 67
162. See generally Juenger, supra note 100. Substantivism presents the idea that judges
should be guided in their decision-making by the quest to apply the optimal available
substantive law, the quiescent and sentient search for an innate justice in the chosen law. See
generally REED, supra note 8.
163. See ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 277-79 (4th ed. 1986)
[hereinafter LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW]; WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 359-60;

Elliot E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLuM. L. REV. 959
(1952); Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. REv. 419 (1984); Robert A.
Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966)
[hereinafter Leflar, Choice-Influencing] .
164. Cheatham & Reese, supra note 163, at 980.
165.

LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, supra note 163, at 279, 298.

166. Id. at 277-79. Leflar lists them as: "(A) Predictability of results; (B) Maintenance of
interstate and international order; (C) Simplification of the judicial task; (D) Advancement of
the forum's governmental interests; (E) Application of the better rule of law." Id. at 279. See
also Leflar, Choice Influencing, supra note 163, at 299 n.111. He draws an interesting
comparison with the language of Lord Reid in Starkowski v. Attorney-General, [1954] A.C.,
155, at 170, in dealing with a problem of legitimacy and successive marriages in different
countries:
To my mind the best way of approaching this question is to consider the
consequences of a decision in either sense. The circumstances are such that no
decision can avoid creating some possible hard cases, but if a decision in one
sense will on the whole lead to much more just and reasonable results, that
appears to me to be a strong argument in its favour.
167.

LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, supra note 163, at 279. Note a number of

academic commentators, broadly within the interest analyst umbrella, have stipulated that courts
should be receptive to substantive considerations in certain kinds of cases. See, e.g., ARTHUR
TAYLOR VON MEHREN & DONALD THEODORE TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS:

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 377, 394, 407-08 (1965) (advocating their

preference for emerging over regressive or anachronistic rules); Robert A. Sedler, Professor
Juenger's Challenge to the Interest Analysis Approach to Choice-of-Law: An Appreciation and
a Response, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865, 866-67 (1990) (opining that he would resolve
unprovided-for cases by use of a common policy among the states favoring recovery);
Weinberg, supra note 148, at 626 (stressing the need for a general assimilation to ordinary
judicial process in multistate cases). See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 284, 359
(arguing that in both true-conflict and unprovided-for cases he would favor claimants unless
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Leflar advocates that courts have almost always tacitly considered
whether one of the competing laws is "anachronistic, behind the
times,"' and they should expressly acknowledge that they prefer to
apply the more "realistic modem rules" as a means of achieving justice
in the individual case.1 69 The underlying theme here is substantivism;
Leflar envisions that judges should be guided in their decision-making
by the quest to apply the optimal available substantive law. 7 0 This
involves the quiescent and sentient search for an innate justice in the
chosen law. Overall, the theory is reflective of an optimal policy
consideration predicated on flexibility in achieving justice for individual
litigants.
Another theme that has been significant in the U.S. choice of law
revolution has been protection of party expectations as to chosen law.17 1
This policy ideal has long been important as a basic element of a fair
legal order. Often its import is at a subliminal level, as statements about
the parties' reasonable expectations mask normative jud ents
reflecting what a court believes the parties ought to expect.
The
underlying premise of the theme is that it is equitable to give one
individual the benefit and to hold the other party to the burden of a law
on which they both actually and reasonably relied.173
Beyond this concept of legitimate party expectations a more
internationalist methodology has been advanced by Von Mehren and
Trautman, amongst other leading academicians.174 The lex fori is not
the rule is anachronistic or aberrational).
168.

LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, supra note 163, at 298.

169. Id. at 299.
170. See generally Symeonides, supra note 35 (discussing "Better Law" principles in
Minnesota and Wisconsin).
171. See Weintraub, supra note 122, at 505. This factor is less significant in tort cases than
contract. For non-intentional torts, liability is always unexpected, and the respective litigants
rarely give advance consideration to the legal consequences of their conduct; but see Max
Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REV. 4, 27-28
(1944); see generally Aaron D. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialismand ProfessorCavers - The
PennsylvaniaMethod, 9 DUQ. L. REV. 373 (1971).
172. See, e.g., Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d. 9 (1964); Bernkrant v.
Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 594-96 (Cal. 1961) (agreement made by Nevada residents subject to
Nevada statute of limitations despite subsequent return of one of the parties to California);
People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria B3PV 102617, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 598-99 (Cal. 1957).
173.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

supra note 84,

§

6(2)(d) and Comments; Moffatt

Hancock, Choice-of-Law Policies in Multiple ContractCases, 5 U. TORONTO L.J. 133, 135, 13740 (1943); see generally Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The
Priority of Fairnessover Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1987); Gary J. Simson, Plottingthe
Next "Revolution" in Choice ofLaw: A ProposedApproach, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 279, at 29194 (1991); Kramer, supra note 150, at 338-40.
174. VoN MEHREN AND TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965); and see
further WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 290-92 (1971).
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accorded overweening significance as with Currie's articulation,17 but
instead a multistate solution is effected to facilitate private legal
interests in multi-jurisdictional transactions.176 Their critique, still of
influence, allows the forum to examine not simply the domestic law of
impacted states, but also the interests of the "multistate order" as
adduced by the forum. The outcome, as Von Mehren and Trautman
have articulated, involves the potentiality of a "multistate solution"
beyond the spatial limits and strictures presented by an ordering of
private interests by domestic law.' 77 This optionality may be attractive
in the case of an international contract beyond domestic borders.
The preceding commentary, set in the context of modem American
objective analysis to the dilemmatic choices presented by choice of law
in contract, serves to illustrate the enervating force, for better or worse,
that academicians have had in this field, and their influence on court and
on state policies. Arguably more so than in any other related branch.
The response of the American Law Institute was the promulgation of
the Second Restatement under the influence of Professor Reese some 37
years after the initial positivistic and vested rights model of the First
Restatement. The new template represented a hybrid eclecticism of the
methodology set out above-something for everyone-and
corresponding support for party autonomy, interest analysis,
substantivism, and protection of legitimate party expectations. There is
a counterpoise between hard and fast rules invoking certainty, allied to
rebuttable presumptions subject to displacement engendering flexibility,
but also with overriding public policy concerns. In deconstructing this
layered approach which now enjoys manifest state support, one is struck
by the number of similarities rather than differences to the Rome I
Regulation, as recently adopted in English law.
C. The Second Restatement
The Second Restatement, in the area of contracts, as well as in other
areas, utilizes a rule-selective methodology that represents a fudged
compromise between various schools of thought about choice of law
method, and between the demands of legal and theoretical
consistency.179 At the heart of the Second Restatement lies the
175. Id. at 78.
176. Id. at 76-79.
177. Id. at 230-32 & 313-27; see also Von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for
Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law
Methodology, 88 HARv. L. REv. 347 (1974).
178. See VON MEHREN & TRAUTMAN, supra note 174, at 246-53.

179. See generally Trautman, Some Notes on the Theory of Choice of Law Clauses, 35
MERCER L. REV. 535 (1984); Juenger, Localising Provisions in International Contracts:
Efficacy, Utility and the Limitation of InternationalRisk, 68 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 649 (1994); Peter
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supremacy of party autonomy, 80 albeit subject to displacement
predicated upon either lack of connection or for public policy. Beyond
express provision of party choice lies an examination of where the
contract is most strongly associated with choice-influencing
considerations at play. This is replicated, to a degree, in the Rome I
Regulation by the adoption of spatial connection to the "characteristic
In
performance" or "overall closest connection" as decisive factors.
this regard, as Reimann has cogently articulated, "Perhaps the European
approach is still more territorial while the American view is more
evaluative, particularly since the Rome Convention (now Regulation)
looks to the contract as a whole while the Second Restatement
envisages a choice issue-by-issue." 8 2
The Second Restatement has propagated a rule-selective
perspective with a flexible set of governing principles, balancing the
requirement for predictability via the widespread adoption of selective
presumptions.1 83 A juxtaposition has been effected between a policycentred approach advocated to choice of law by leading academicians
and a centre of gravity theory.
At the very cornerstone of both the Second Restatement and the
Rome I Regulation is the concept of party autonomy which is
representative of Savigny's historical triumph. 184 It is provided by
section 187 that parties' choice, express or readily to be inferred, is to
be given effect, but subject to certain reservations:

Nygh, The ReasonableExpectations of the Partiesas a Guide to the Choice of Law in Contract
and Tort, 251 RECUEIL DES COURs 269 (1995); Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home:

Traditional Conflict of Laws and the American Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 615 (1979);
Garner, Formation of International Contracts - Finding the Right Choice of Law Rules, 63
AUSTRALIAN L.J. 751 (1989).
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84, § 187.

Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified expectations of the
parties and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will be
their rights and liabilities under the contract. These objectives may best be
attained in multistate transactions by letting the parties choose the law to
govern the validity of the contract and the rights created thereby. In this way,
certainty and predictability of result are most likely to be secured.
See id. cmt. e; see also Reese, supra note 19, at 22 (giving effect to the parties' choice,
"'provides the best means of assuring that the parties' expectations will be satisfied."').
181. See Rome 1, supra note 11, art. 4(2) & (4);
Reimann, supra note 7, at 581.
182. Reimann, supra note 7, at 581-82.
183. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84.
184. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN

(Berlin Bei

Veit & Co., 1840).
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(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular
issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an
explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular
issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an
explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless
either-the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice, or application of the law of the chosen
state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which
has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of
§ 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of
an effective choice of law by the parties.' 8 5
In the introductory part of this Article the importance and beneficial
consequences appurtenant to party autonomy were highlighted. Thus, it
is to be welcomed that section 187 clearly and explicitly adopts the
lodestar of party autonomy.186 By parity of reasoning, the Second
Restatement and Rome I Regulation set out contractual issues which lie
within the deliverance of the respective parties: time and method of
delivery; interpretation; damages assessment; consequences of nullity;
and the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and presumption and
limitation of actions.' 8 7 The first paragraph of section 187 sets out those
matters which the parties may determine by agreement, and the
governing law to particularized issues within the contract.' 8 8 The main
panoply of contractual applicable terms consequently fall within the
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84,

§

187; but see Bauerfield, supra note 2, at

1676-77 for criticism of this eclectic response where he asserts: "This exception was meant to
be triggered infrequently. However, because of courts' free-wheeling use of the exception and
the consequent necessity for litigants to address the issue, a court faced with a governing law
clause will be compelled in nearly every case to determine whether the exception applies."
186. See generally George F. Carpinello, Testing the Limits of Choice of Law Clauses:
FranchiseContracts as a Case Study, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 57 (1990).
187. See generally Rome I, supra note 11; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84, § 187.
Analyzing English choice of law and the Rome Convention (now Regulation), Jaffey
distinguished between thejus dispositivum, which is law that fills the gaps for the parties as to
matters which are within their power to decide, and the jus cogens, which is mandatory law as to
which the parties are not free to evade See Jaffey, supra note 83, at 542-44. In choosing a jus
cogens, the parties' choice is essentially irrelevant, "for it is the essence ofjus cogens that it
overrides the parties' choice." See Jaffey, supra note 83, at 542-43; see also WEINTRAUB, supra
note 52, at 362-63.
188.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supranote 84,
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provenance of this first paragraph, and the fundamental right of choice
is protected. 89
This has numerous adventitious benefits in terms of adopting a
governing legal system which reposes familiarity and confidence for the
parties. It often comports to a system where they reside and effect their
business. Subliminally, if there are gaps left in the contract, the attorney
wants them filled by the law she is most familiar with. Through making
it clear that the parties may choose a particular law which will cover all
of these issues, the rule ensures considerable certainty in contractual
relationships and validly protects legitimate party expectations.1 9 0 The
practical benefits attached to an express choice of law, subsequently
upheld by the appointed legal system, are manifest:
It is usually to the advantage of all involved if the choice-of-law
question is resolved by agreement ex ante. Such agreements
allow the parties to make a choice that fits their own needs and to
act in compliance with the chosen law. Choice-of-law clauses
avoid litigation and thus save both the parties and the courts time
and money. There is also little reason to believe that courts will
make a better choice than the parties themselves.191
In paragraph two, on the other hand, there is recognition of issues
which are not normally within the power of the parties to contract.192
The expressly chosen law will be displaced, and party autonomy
restricted, on the premises of either lack of real connection or
alternatively for public policy.' 9 3 Within this purview it is suggested
that a paradoxical tension is prevalent. The eminence grisd of section
187 is party autonomy through express choice, but this is supplanted by
overriding state interests on matters which one intended legal system
has not left to respective party intention.' 94 There is a delicate balancing
exercise involved between private and state legitimate interests, and a
resolution is found via the mechanism of flexible displacement
provisions.
The parties are free to choose a governing law, even outwith the
agreement of one interested legal system, provided the flexible
displacement provisions are inoperable in that: (1) the law chosen has
189. See Reese, supra note 29, at 534; see generally Gruson supra note 2; Walter Weeler
Cook, The Logical andLegal Base of the Conflict ofLaws, 33 YALE L.J. 426 (1924); Hessel E.
Yntema, "Autonomy " in Choice ofLaw, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341 (1952).
190. See generally Zhang, supra note 7; Gruson supra note 2.
191. Reimann supra note 7, at 589.
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84, § 187(2).
193. See id., § 187(2)(a) & (b).
194. See generally Sedler, supra note 20; Prebble, supranote 23.
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some substantial relationship to the transaction or there is another
reasonable basis for their choice; and (2) the application of a law chosen
would not be:
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue and which, under the rule of section 188, would
be the state whose law is applicable in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties. 95
The impact, as Sedler has stated, is that the parties may eviscerate
the otherwise governing law through the express choice of an
alternative law which has a genuine touchstone to the agreement,
provided they do not supplant the mandatory law which is crucial to the
avoided state, and where that state has a materially greater concern in
applying its law than the state chosen by the parties.' Furthermore, in
accordance with the interpretative strictures of section 187, the law
chosen by the parties will be the local law of the state in question unless
the respective parties state to the contrary.' 9 7
The Second Restatement itself is opaque as to what might be a
"fundamental policy" of the impacted state and so one is left to
supposition. A refrain elucidated from comments in the Restatement are
that the policy "must in any event be a substantial one," and it is
suggested that formalities such as statutes of fraud, or anachronistic
laws, will not amount to overriding fundamental interests. 198 In
contradistinction, as set out below on English public policy concerns,
laws which make certain kinds of contracts illegal, which contain
racially discriminatory terms, or which are designed to protect parties
from the "oppressive use of superior bargaining power," may well

195.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84,

§ 187(2)(a)

& (b); see also Zhang, supra

note 7, at 534-36; see generally Robert Johnson, Party Autonomy in Contracts Specifying
ForeignLaw, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv. 37 (1966).
196. See Sedler, supra note 23, at 286.
197.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84,

§

187(3); see also Sedler, supra note 23,

at 280.
198.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supranote 84,

§ 187(3)

cmt. g; Reese, supra note 29, at 536.

The forum will only deny effect to a choice of law provision in order to
protect what in its view is an important interest or, in the language of the
draft, "a fundamental policy" of the State of the otherwise governing law.
Unfortunately, existing authority provides few clues as to what considerations
will guide the forum in determining whether a given policy is fundamental in
this sense.
Id.
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crystallize as the infraction of fundamental policies.' 99
The combined effects of subsections (1) and (2) of section 187 can
best be demonstrated by means of an illustration. It is illuminating to
evaluate the impact in light of an international choice of law dispute,
and to reflect on a modified factual scenario to that presented in Iran
Cont'1 Shelf Oil Co. v. IRI Int'1 Co.,200 a leading English Court of
Appeal decision on imputed choice and place of performance in terms
of the characteristic performance. 201 A multistate dispute arose
involving an Iranian corporation (plaintiff) and the defendant a
Delaware corporation whose principal place of business was located in
Texas, but which also had an office in England. 202 The essence of the
agreement concentrated on refurbishment of the plaintiffs oil rigs in
Iran, but with other ancillary services also to be provided.2 03 An issue,
inter alia, arose over whether there was an express choice of Iranian or
Texan law. 204 The plaintiff arguing for the former on the premise of
submission during earlier negotiations of their stated terms and
conditions, incorporating a choice of Iranian law. 20 5 The defendants
contended the latter on the predicate that their quotation for work was
subject to terms and conditions which included a choice of Texan
law. 206 The issue was important because of an executive decree issued
by the President of the United States, after the contract was concluded,
prohibiting performance in Iran.207 Suppose, by way of postulation,
however, that rather than Iran the contract was to be performed in
England for shipbuilding provision and ancillary services, and that the
decree was issued vis-a-vis any Iranian corporation, irrespective of
locality. The designated contract had an English choice of law term, and
included a clause providing for a fixed penalty if the contractor failed to
complete by a stipulated date. Moreover, this is viewed as penal and
unenforceable by Texan law, but enforceable by English law, and the
contractor fails to complete on time.
In order to consider the enforceability of the initial contractual terms
and penal clause, a court, in accordance with section 187, would need to
follow a certain pathway.2 0 8 Initially, it would be incumbent upon the
199. See David Jackson, Mandatory Rules and Rules of "Ordre Public," in CONTRACT
CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 62; see generally Hellner, supra note 86; Chong, supra note 86, at
33.
200. Iran Cont'l Shelf Oil Co., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1024 (A.C.).
201. See id
202. Id 3.
203. Id 5.
204. Id T 7.
205. Id
206. Id
207. Id. 6.
208.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84, § 187.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

33

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3

392

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23

court to determine whether according to the law that would be
applicable in the absence of choice, the respective parties had the
authority to contract as they did in this particular concern.209 As stated,
the laws differ on this point, as such a term would be valid and
consequently recognized under English law qua fori, but not under
Texan law. This leads the court to evaluate which law was more
"significantly related" to the transaction or to the parties. 21 0 There is
competing interests at stake as Texan law has an interest herein in
preventing economic oppression, and the dyspeptic corporation is
located within the state, whereas English law has a strata of interest in
ensuring that those who contracted in good faith for the benefit of such
a clause can enforce it. In dilemmatic choices such as these, Reimann
has argued that the American experience has shown that, "such
approaches are fraught with subjectivism, indeterminacy and more than
the normal share of forum law preference." 2 1 ' If English law has the
most significant relationship to the issue then the parties are deemed to
have capacity to agree on the charge, but if Texan law is found to have
the most significant relationship English law will still apply under s.
187(2), unless Texan law is thought to have a "materially greater
interest" in the issue than England and its anti-penalty clause embodies
a "fundamental policy" of its law. 12 Moreover, the decree against antiIranian engagement fits within the fundamental policy umbrella, and, of
course, requires extirpation as part of overriding public policy of the
addressed forum.
As highlighted by the illustration above, a derivation from Iran
Continental Oil Shelf Co., the certainty and protection of legitimate
interests that section 187 was meant to offer the parties to multistate
contracts is obviously diminished by the coalescence of interactions at
which a court's predilections about the degree of a state's "interest" and
the "fundamentality" of a policy enter into the choice of law
presumption. 213 The functional reappraisal may be to reformulate the
overarching rules as presumptions, consequently weakened by "escape
clauses. 21 It is suggested, however, that the experience in real practical
209. See supra text accompanying notes 184-89 & 228-34. Author's interpretation herein
of the nexus and inter-relationship between sections 187 and 188 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 84.
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84.

211. Reimann, supra note 7, at 590.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 184-89 & 228-34. Author's interpretation herein
of the nexus and inter-relationship between sections 187 and 188 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 84.

213. See generally Reppy, supra note 8; Borchers, supra note 48; Friedler, supra note 71;
Roosevelt, supra note 98 (noting the flexibility available to courts when determining the validity
of a choice of law agreement).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 106-09.
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terms has been rather different. Despite the open-textured nature of the
key provisions in section 187, notably in the context of the debates
behind the meaning of "interest" and "fundamentality" nevertheless the
operational problems have been salved by the significant list of
21
This
rebuttable presumptions to which a court may constantly revert.m
reflects a point of departure from the more limited hard and fast rules in
the Rome I Regulation, albeit that the eight new provisions in Article
4(1)(a)-(h) has significantly extended the straitened Rome Convention
216
flexibility, as from the December 17, 2009 inception date. In general,
the Second Restatement is demarcated by a particularized choice on an
issue by issue basis, whereas the Rome I Regulation ultimately looks to
215. Note the special-situation contract rules (§§ 189-197) accede first to section 187
which grants parties autonomy regarding choice, and second to the local law of another state if
that state has a more significant relationship, under section 6, with respect to a particular issue.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84,

§

187(1) & (2). If neither of these two criteria is

satisfied, then these sections establish the presumption that a particular locality will have the
most significant relationship. See id § 187(2). Specifically, these special-situation contracts are:
Land contracts - law of situs, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

supra note 84,

§§

189-190; (2) Contracts to sell interests in chattels - the place of delivery, see id.
§ 191; (3) Life insurance contracts - the domicile of the insured, see id. § 192;
(4) Contracts of fire, surety, or casualty insurance - the principal location of the
insured risk, see id. § 193; (5) Contracts of suretyship - the law governing the
principal obligations, see id. § 194; (6) Contracts for the repayment of money
lent - the place of repayment, see id. § 195; (7) Contracts for the rendition of
services - the place where the major portion of the services are to be rendered,
see id § 196; and (8) Contracts of transportation - place of departure or
dispatch, see id. § 197.
The following sections are also governed first by section 187 and then section 188. They show
that with respect to certain specific issues, the following choice considerations enumerated in
section 6 will usually be afforded weight. See id. §§ 198-207. These are:
(1) Capacity to contract - state of domicile, see id. § 198; (2) Requirements of
a Writing-Formalities - state of execution, see id. § 199; (3) Validity of
contract in Respects other than capacity or formalities - Rule of § 187 and §
188, see id. § 200; (4) Misrepresentation, Duress, Undue Influence, and
Mistake - Rule of § 187 and § 188, see id. § 201; (5) Illegality - state of
performance, see id. § 202; (6) Usury - rule of validation in usury cases, see
id. § 203; (7) Construction of Words Used in Contract - Rule of § 1.87 and §
188, see id. § 204; (8) Nature and Extent of Contractual obligations - rule of §
187 and § 188, See id. § 205; (9) Details of performance - state of
performance, see id. § 206; and (10) Measure of Recovery - rule of § 187 and
§ 188, see id. § 207.
216. See generally Zheng Tang, Law Applicable in the Absence of Choice - The New
Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, 71(5) MOD. L. REV. 785 (2008) (noting the hard-and-fast
rules of Article 4 may still allow flexibility for courts); MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 64, at
351-92.
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the contract as a whole, and separate treatment of individual aspects
remain the exception not the rule. 2 17 The presumptions laid out in the
Second Restatement take on enhanced allure in circumstances where the
application of the traditional pathway may lead to equivocality in which
none of the competing laws has a pre-eminent claim to govern. The
breadth of the special-situation contracts under the auspices of the
Second Restatement has impacted to an extent on the recent
reformulation of European contractual principles. 2 18
"The limiting of party autonomy by the policy determinations of an
interested state is not unique to American law." 19 As discussed more
fully in Part 3, "the same significant limitation is inherent in the law of
most continental countries and is reflected in the . . . Rome I

Regulation." 220 Party autonomy is provided for in Article 3, paragraph
1, whereby it is stated that a contract shall be governed by the law
chosen by the parties. 22 1 The ambit of such autonomy is couched in
222
similar vein to the Restatement. Hence, at least as to matters which
are within the contractual power of the parties to determine, their choice
of law shall be given conclusive effect. 223 There is a corresponding
limitation as Article 3(1) must be read in conjunction with further
provisions within Article 3, and in respect of Article 9 which apply
overriding mandatory rules which cannot be derogated from by
agreement. 224 There is parity with the "fundamental policy" determinate
within section 187, and the new provisions of the Rome I Regulation 22 5
217. See generally C.M.V. CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Oxford

University Press, 4th ed. 2011); LAWRENCE COLLINS, DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (Lawrence Collins et al. eds., Sweet & Maxwell, 14th ed. 2006); Simon
Atrill, Choice of Law in Contract: The Missing Pieces of the Article 4 Jigsaw?, 53 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 549 (2008); Zheng Tang, The Interrelationship of European Jurisdiction and
Choice ofLaw in Contract,4 J.PRIVATE INT'L L. 35 (2008).
218. See generally Tang, supra note 216 (listing several special-situation contracts similar
to the Second Restatement).
219. Carpinello, supra note 186, at 64.
220. See infra text accompanying notes 422-32; see generally Rome I, supra note 11; see
also Carpinello,supra note 186, at 65.
221. See Rome I, supra note 11, art. 3(1).
222. See supra text accompanying note 16.
223. See Russell J. Weintraub, How to Choose Law for Contracts and How Not To: The
EEC Convention, 17 TEX. INT'L L.J. 155, 156-57 (1982) (discussing the choice of law to
determine construction, which is within the parties' power to determine and the choice of law to
determine the validity of a contract, which is not always within the parties' power to determine).
224. See infra text accompanying notes 424-31. See generally Hellner, supra note 86
(describing the development of the overriding mandatory rules); Chong, supra note 86
(discussing the mandatory rules of Article 3); Christopher Tillman, The Relationship between
Party Autonomy and the Mandatory Rules in the Rome Convention, 2002 J. Bus. L. 45
(discussing the mandatory rules of the Convention).
225. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84, § 187 2(b), and Rome I, supra note
11, with Rome Convention, supra note 32, art. 7(1). By Article 3(3) states:
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are less expansive than the old provisions within Article 7 of the Rome
Convention which was far wider in allowing a court to give deference to
the mandatory law of a state which simply had a "close connection" to
the situation. 26 Nonetheless a tension is still inherent in AngloAmerican law between the concept of party autonomy, its recognition as
an absolute rule of construction, and countervailing state interests of a
public nature that demand to be evaluated in the applicable law
*227
equation.
If the parties have not expressly chosen an applicable law, or where
the purported choice fails to comport with section 187(2), then section
188 will apply to facilitate the governing law. 228 Every particularized

Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are
located in a country other than the country whose law has been chosen, the
choice of the parties shall not prejudice the application of provisions of the
law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by agreement.
Rome I, supranote 11, art. 3(3). Article 3(4) states:
Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are
located in one or more Member States, the parties' choice of applicable law
other than that of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of
provisions of Community law, where appropriate as implemented in the
Member State of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.
Id. art. 3(4). Overriding mandatory provisions in Article 9(1) are regarded as:
Provisions the respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for
safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or economic
organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling
within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract
under this Regulation.
Id. art. 9(1).
226. Note that because of the potential for deep inroads being made to the doctrine of party
autonomy, and a coach and horses through express choice of law, the benefits or otherwise of
the "mandatory rule" provisions of Article 7 proved enduringly controversial. Much ink has
been spilt criticizing the onerous strictures incurred. See Patrick Ross Williams, The EEC
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 23
(1986); see also F.A. Mann, The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
437, 438 (1987); see generally Tillman, supra note 224 (criticizing Article 7 of the Rome
Convention). The United Kingdom declined to adhere to Article 7(1), as it was permitted to do
under Article 22 of the Convention. See Rome Convention, supra note 32, art. 22; see also
GIULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10, at 27. As a result of the disputed issue
Article 7(1) was not in force in Germany, in Luxembourg, Ireland and the United Kingdom.
227. See generally Kurt H. Nadelmann, Impressionism and Unification of Law: The EEC
Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractualand Non-Contractual Obligations, 24
Am. J. COMP. L. I (1976).

228. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

supra note 84,
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choice of law issue should, according to section 188, be resolved by
ascription of, "the local law of the state which, with respect to that
issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties under the principles stated in § 6."229 In essence, these factors
extend to a degree Professor Leflar's list of "choice-influencing"
considerations, but omit his stated preferential adoption of the "better
rule of law." 230 These contracts are to be evaluated by courts according
to their respective importance with respect to the particular issue: 23 1
§. 6. Choice-of-Law Principles
A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.When there is
no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include:
the needs of the interstate and international systems, the relevant
policies of the forum, the relevant policies of other interested
states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, the protection of justified
who asserts:
[A]ll of the policies must be considered, and the choice of law rule developed
must give effect to the most important policies for the precise purpose at
hand. However, because the policies in any given case may not necessarily
point in the same direction, the significance of a particular factor will vary
depending on the context. Perhaps for this reason, the Second Restatement
has been criticised for being too rigid and amorphous, which would defeat the
goals of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result that the Second
Restatement was designed to achieve.
229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84, § 188(1) (emphasis added).

230. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
231. See Willis L.M. Reese, General Course on Private International Law, 150 RECUEIL
DES COURs 1, 180 (1976), where, as the Reporter of the Second Restatement, he asserts that
the approach affects the development of clear and precise rules.
I believe that one ultimate goal, be it ever so distant, should be the
development of hard-and-fast rules of choice of law. I believe that in many
instances these rules should be directed, at least initially, at a particular issue.
And I believe that in the development of these rules consideration should be
given to the basic objectives of choice of law, to the relevant local law rules
of the potentially interested states and, of course, to the contacts of the parties
and of the occurrence with these states.
Id.
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expectations, the basic policies underlying the particular field of
ease in
law, certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 232
the determination and application of the law to be applied.
As part of the facilitation of the applicable rule of law examination,
section 188(2) amplifies these general factors by providing a list of the
contacts that may be relevant in identifying the states whose laws
should be considered: "the place of contracting; the place of negotiation
of the contract; the place of performance; the location of the subjectmatter of the contract; and the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation, and place of business of the parties." 233 In terms of
practical application, an evaluative list of this nature invokes a "contactcounting" approach to choice of law, wherein the factual connection of
the case with competing legal systems is functionally distilled and
computed together for each jurisdiction.
The "contact-counting" weighing of juridical touchstones can occur
without a coherent assessment of the significance of each connection in
terms of the domestic and multistate policies engaged in dispute
resolution.234 However, it is self-evident that the multilayered
factorization of relevant touchstones in section 188(2) is only a
checklist for the court and that the disparate factors contained within
section 6 must be applied in judging the extent to which each individual
precept should be regarded as crucial. 235 This ideological perspective, as
applied to govern implied choice of law in the absence of party choice,
is the most significant demarcation from the novel resolution contained
in Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation, as set out below.2 36 The template
laid out in section 188 adopts a process which is evaluative in nature
with a potpourri of relevant factors for the court's determination. 237 By
way of contrast, Article 4 is more prescriptive and less intuitive, and it
is founded on spatial territorial connections predicated around key
precepts of "characteristic performance," "habitual residence," and
"closest connection." 238 The "escape device" presented by "closest
connection" in the absence of choice now only applies in a constricted
ambit.239
The attractiveness of the Second Restatement to choice of law in
232.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84, INTRODUCTION

§ 6.

233. See id. § 188(2).
234. See Blom, supra note 104, at 227; Carpinello, supra note 186, at 80-81; Weinberg,
supra note 148, at 620 (discussing states' legitimate interest in its residents' welfare).
235. See generally Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004) (discussing the
significance of overarching public policy considerations).
236. Rome I,supra note 11, art. 4.
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84,

§

188.

238. See Rome I, supra note 11, art. 4(2) & (3).
239. See infra text accompanying notes 510-539.
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contract results from its symbiotic inter-twining of rule-selection and
competing state interests analysis. It salves the conscience of both the
multilateralist and unilateralist; indeed, the approach is simultaneously
jurisdiction-selecting and rule-selecting. 240 The products of these
theories are planted together in a fruitful union to effect sections 6, 187
and 188. The edifice created lays down specific rules, obviates any need
to extrapolate true and false conflicts, and yet appeals to Currie's
progeny by referring to, "the relevant policies of other interested states
and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue." 241
The extensive list of "relevant" factors opened up a limitless vista to
the law reformer as suitable indicators to be evaluated in the formation
of new (any they wish) rules. Its success, and it has enjoyed widespread
adoption by numerous states,24 2 depends upon judicial intuitionism, and
judges desire to set aside old rules for more "equitable" new ones to
reach optimal results. It is hardly surprising that it has been seized on by
the judiciary to resolve the nightmare presentation of choice of law
matters where the role of the law is far more retrospective than
prospective. In one sense the Second Restatement fulfils the optimal
jurisprudential policy balance between certainty and ease of application,
as set against flexibility. It requires a fresh examination of antediluvian
choice of law rules, and facilitates an appraisal that is issue-orientated
rather than concentrated on whole areas of law such as contract, tort or
marnage.
However, critics have faulted the Second Restatement approach
because of its eclectic categorization of supposedly relevant factors. 2 43
Uncertainty is obviously promulgated by such an extensive list of
criteria. It has been derided as so general as to be useless, providing a
list "includ[ing] just about everything anyone ever suggested might be
meaningful to choice of law analysis-though with no explanations of
why any of these factors are in fact relevant." 244 It has been submitted
that, "the factors often point in different directions and carry in
themselves no measures of their significance."24 5 To detractors, the
240.

See AMos SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 214 (Martinus

Nijhoff 1970).
241.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84,

§§

6(2)(c), 187 & 188.

242. See Symeonides, supra note 35, at 279-80.
243. See generally Kramer, supra note 150 (discussing the criticism of the interest analysis
of the Second Restatement); see also William L. Reynolds, Symposium, The Silver Anniversary
of the Second Conflicts Restatement, 56 MD. L. REv. 1193, 1193-95 (1997).
244. See Kramer, supra note 150, at 321 n.149.
245. See D. F. Cavers, ContemporaryConflicts Law in American Perspective, 131 RECUEIL
DES COURs 75, 145 (1970); see also Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts
Restatement (anda ProposalforTort Conflicts), 75 IND. L. REv. 437, 444-45 (2000) (criticizing
the Second Restatement approach as flexible and as "non-rules").
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Second Restatement flirts with both rule-selection and jurisdictionselection at the same time, yet produces an ultimately superficial
allure.2 4 6 The model has been vigorously criticized by Ehrenzweig who
castigated the balancing test provided through "most significant
relationship" as a "give-it-up formula" and suggested greater scope was
needed for parties' autonomy (outside the field of adhesion contracts)
together with a general policy of validation.2 4 7 For contrary reasons,
Sedler has denigrated the scheme as giving too much scope to the
parties' intentions by insisting on the involvement of a "fundamental
policy" of another state before the parties' choice of law is denied
effect.24 8 There is also a danger that section 6, with its largely
uncoordinated list of choice-influencing factors, offers too much scope
for soli sistic determination by courts when express choice is
lacking. 9 A temptation is offered to indulge in "'factor-counting' that
is no more articulate or principled than the 'contact-counting' that the
section was meant to preclude."2 5 0
In summary, however, despite the intemperate nature of some
criticism, it is contended that the Second Restatement provisions enjoy a
variety of adventitious benefits. The readiness to give effect to the
parties' expressed or inferred intention is meritorious as is the careful
delineation of separate issues for individual choice of law treatment.251
There is a logical consistency in the schematic template and appropriate
acknowledgment of subjectivity and objectivity in the process. Overall,
the merits significantly outweigh the demerits and the optimal goal of
protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties is preserved. Total
uniformity of result is an unattainable Utopia unless one is willing to
accept egregious outcomes produced on occasion by a totally
positivistic test. As Shapira has commented, "the diverse material
characterizing conflict of laws problems is bound to defy any such
ambition, forever dooming its pursuers to the frustrating fate of a Don
Quixote." 252 The Second Restatement represents an effective and
pragmatic solution to the choice of law solution that has profoundly
influenced European initiatives. A feature of this pragmatism has been
246. See generally Shapira, supra note 114 (criticizing the inconsistent reasoning in the
Restatement despite its appealing virtues); SHAPIRA, supra note 240 (same); Kramer, supra note
150 (criticizing the single theory approach of the Restatement).
247. ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 168 (3d ed. 1974); ALBERT A.
EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 458-59 (1962); see Shapira, supra note

114, at 255 (urging for a re-examination of choice of law policy).
248. Sedler, supra note 23, at 294-99.
249. Id. at 299; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84,

§

187, INTRODUCTION

§

6.

250. Blom, supra note 104, at 234.
251. See Hill, supra note 18, at 1626; see generally Blom, supra note 104; Prebble, supra
note 23.
252. Shapira, supra note 114, at 260.
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deployment of the public policy escape device on both sides of the
Atlantic to refuse application of an otherwise applicable law because it
offends against the essential social or juridical concepts of the forum. It
represents in practice another discrete area where collinearity broadly
prevails.
D. PublicPolicy
English common law will deny effect to a choice of law clause
where the effect of the application of the chosen law is to produce a
253
The
result which is contrary to the public policy of the forum.
supremacy of party autonomy has been overridden in American law
through public policy concerns which are embodied as "strong" 254 or
As Scholes et al. have asserted, the experience of
"fundamental."
American courts has engaged consideration of whether a public policy
fits within a particularized statute or traditional rule, and has been
transmogrified into whether the policy is crystallized as, "inherently
vicious, wicked or immoral," "offensive to justice or public welfare" or
"abhorrent to public policy."25 6 If these thresholds are met then a
stipulated contractual term has been stigmatized as offensive and
unenforceable. 257 Similarly, the Rome I Regulation provides in its
Article 21 that the application of foreign law may be refused only if it is
"manifestly incompatible" with the public policy of the forum.25
The crucial determinant relates to the effect of applying the chosen
law terms, and whether that performance is abhorrent and immoral, and
not simply on whether the choice of law itself may feasibly offend
public policy.2 59 This effects doctrine is shared by Anglo-American
traditions, and by implication it overrides the effectual terms of the
proper law which subjugates policy concerns, not the overarching

choice itself.260
253. FAWCETr ET AL., supra note 32, at 759-59; see also C.M.V. CLARKSON & J.HILL, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 353 (4th ed. 2011).

254. See generally Thera-Kinetics Inc. v. Managed Home Recovery, Inc., No. 95 C 3821,
1997 WL 610305 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 29, 1997); Param Petroleum Corp. v. Commerce and Indus.
Ins. Co., 296 N.J. Super 164, 170 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
255. See generally Martino v. Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc., 554 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1966); Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc., 506 A.2d. 817 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1986).
256. EUGENE F. SCHOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 864-65 (3d. ed. 2000).

257. Id.
258. See Rome I, supra note 11, art. 21. See Jackson, supra note 199; see generally Chong,
supra note 86.
259. See generally D. St. L. Kelly, Reference, Choice, Restriction and Prohibition, 26
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 857 (1977); A. Thomson, A Different Approach to Choice of Law in
Contract,43 MOD. L. REv. 650 (1980).
260. See generally Peter Kincaid, Choice of Law in Contract: the ALRC Proposals, 8 J.
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An illustration of the effects doctrine is provided by the leading
English case of Ralli Bros. v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar,261in
which English charterers, by a charter party made in London, chartered
a Spanish ship to carry a cargo of jute from Calcutta to Barcelona at an
agreed freight, part of which was to be paid in Barcelona on the arrival
of the ship there.2 6 2 Spanish legislation passed after the making of the
contract, but before the arrival of the ship at Barcelona, laid down that
the freight payable on jute imported into Spain should not exceed a
certain rate and made it an offence to pay or receive freight above that
amount. 263 The freight agreed in the charter party to be payable in Spain
exceeded the statutory rate, and the issue for the English court was
whether the ship owners were entitled to recover the excess.264 It was
determined by the Court of Appeal that in view of the Spanish
legislation the excess was not recoverable; the contract, which was
governed by English law, was not enforceable to the extent that it
required performance in Spain which was prohibited by Spanish law.2 65
The proper law did not become Spanish, though, as in accordance with
the "effects doctrine" on policy in all other respect the contract
remained governed by English law.26 6
It is the multifarious public interests of the forum which
transmogrify into overriding public policy considerations. The focal
point is state and societal interests, rather than individualized private
orderings, and a refusal to enforce a contract because of restraint of
trade is illustrative of this branch of comity interest. 267 It is comity, or
lack of, that is juxtaposed with the effects doctrine to shape the ambit of
policy derivations from choice.268 At a practical level, the public interest
of the forum embraces their relationship with alternative states on
comity grounds, to protect economic and other common shared goals
CoNT. L. 231 (1994); 0. Kahn-Freund et al., Reflections on Public Policy in the English Conflict
of Laws, Problemsof Public andPrivate InternationalLaw, Transactionsfor the Year 1953, in
39 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUs SOCIETY 39-40 (1953); I. F. G. Baxter, Choice of Law, 42
CANADIAN BAR REv. 46 (1964).
261. Ralli Bros. v. Compafria Naviera Sota Y Aznar, [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (A.C.) (Eng.).
262. Id. at 287.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 291; see F. A. Mann, Proper Law and Illegality in PrivateInternationalLaw,
18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 110-11 (1937) (discussing the Ralli court's decision).
266. See Ralli Bros., 2 K.B. 287, at 293.
267. See Rousillon v. Rousillon, [1880) 14 Ch.D. 351, at 369
(Eng.); see generally
Kincaid, supra note 2, at 93-94.
268. See generally William E. Holder, Public Policy and National Preferences: The
Exclusion of Foreign Law in English Private International Law, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 926
(1968); A. J. E. Jaffey, Essential Validity of Contracts in the English Conflict of Laws, 23 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 1 (1974); P.B. Carter, Contracts in English Private International Law, in 57
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 31 (Oxford Press 1987) (1986).
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and opportunities.269 A moral backdrop applies to a standardization of
common interests, wherein a foreign law is refused application as it
opposes the key values and standards of the forum law, for instance in
*
**
* *270
terms of prejudicial racial or class discrimination.
The concept of comity, allied to the effects doctrine, plays a
significant part in choice of law, as in other branches of private
international law. 27 1 The interests of the forum state override the
respective parties and if the application of a particular provision of the
governing law will jeopardize Anglo-American friendly relations with
other states, that may be a reason for interfering.2 By way of
illustration, in Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia, Ltd.,27 3 a contract provided for
274
the sale of jute bags by Indian sellers to Swiss buyers. Although the
contract provided for the goods to be shipped to Genoa, to the
knowledge of the sellers the buyers intended to reship the goods from
Genoa to South Africa.2 Under Indian law the shipment from India of
jute destined for or intended to be taken to South Africa was prohibited
as both parties well knew. 276 When the sellers repudiated the contract it
was held by the House of Lords that the contract should not be enforced
by the English court, even though the contract did not itself impose an
obligation to ship Indian jute to South Africa. 2 77 The decision was a
matter of comity, that is, part of public policy. 278 Although the case was
unlike Ralli Bros. in that the court was not asked to order something
illegal to be done in the foreig jurisdiction, the whole contract was
tainted by the illegal purpose,
so that for the court to enforce the
contract would give the appearance of condoning the evasion of Indian
law and so to jeopardize relations with India. This resonance was
269. See generally FAWCETT ET AL., supra note 32, at 758-62.

270. See, e.g., Oppenheimer v. Cattermole (Inspector of Taxes), [1976] A.C. 252 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.); see also Kaufman v. Gerson, [1904] 1 K.B. 591, at 591 (Eng.);
Golden Acres, Ltd. v. Qld. Estates Pty., Ltd., [1969] Qd R 378 (Austl.).
271. See Alan Reed, TransnationalNon-Judicial Divorces: A Comparative Analysis of
Recognition Under English and U.S. Jurisprudence, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 311
(1996) (discussing divorce recognition context); Alan Reed, Essential Validity of Marriage:The
Application of Interest Analysis and Depecage to Anglo-American Choice of Law Rules, 20
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP.L. 387 (2000) (discussing marriage capacity); Reed, supra note
102 (discussing doctrine of forum non-conveniens); REED, supra note 8, ch. 6 (in the context of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments).
272. See generally Jaffey supra note 268; Mann, supra note 226.
273. Regazzoni v. KC Sethia (1947), [1958] A.C. 301 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
274. Id. at 301.
275. Id. at 303.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 302.
278. Id. at 302 & 323 where Lord Reid articulated that, "The real question is one of public
policy in English law;" see Carter,supra note 268; see generally Jaffey, supra note 83.
279. See Regazzoni, [1958] A.C. 301, at 302.
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enhanced as the law in question was a sensitive racial one banning
exports from India to South Africa. 280 Viscount Simonds said in
Regazzoni that public policy, "will avoid at least some contracts which
violate the laws of a foreign state" on grounds of comity.281
It is important to the parties that they have a degree of certainty
applied to whether their contemplated stipulations will be validated. In
this respect, a number of U.S. authorities have provided more concrete
guidelines vis-ci-vis the overriding nature of public policy exceptions
and thresholds of profound violations of forum law.2 In Compania de
Inversiones Internacionales v. IndustrialMortgage Bank of Finland,283
the public policy criterion was invoked to override the stipulated law. 284
At issue, a bond purchase agreement concluded between a Colombian
corporation (plaintiff) and a Finnish bank, and a term invoking a gold
clause to recover the equivalent in dollars of the value in gold coin at
the amount at which the bonds had been called.285 It was determined,
looking at the purposive nature of a joint resolution in Congress
nullifying such gold payment clauses, that it operated spatially to a
foreign bond issued and payable in the United States.28 6 The evasive
intent of the clause contradicted public policy even though the
respective parties were non-resident, and even though they invoked
New York law to apply to the agreement. 287 The court asserted:
The joint resolution has thus revealed clearly the intention of the
Congress to regulate the kind and amount of the currency
wherewith the obligation may be discharged, as a matter of
public policy in this jurisdiction. The parties to a contract may
not by their intention, however expressed, override the laws of
the country in which suit is brought when a matter of the public
policy of that country is involved ... Consequently, it becomes

immaterial whether the obligations of these bonds would
otherwise be governed by some foreign law. 288
Furthermore, in F.A. Strauss and Co. v. CanadianPac. Ry. Co., 289
the purposive invasive intent principle was also applied to violate
280. See Regazzoni, [1958] A.C. 301, at 303; Carter, supra note 268, at 30.
281. See Regazzoni, [1958] A.C. 301, at 319.
282. See generally Bauerfield, supra note 2; Gruson, supra note 2; Ribl, supra note 1.
283. Compania De Inversions Internacionales v. Indus. Mortg. Bank of Fin., 198 N.E. 617
(N.Y. 1935).
284. Id at 621 n.6.
285. Id. at 618.
286. Id. at 621.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. F.A. Strauss & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 254 N.Y. 407, 414-15 (N.Y. 1930).
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clauses in a bill of lading issued by a common-carrier at a foreign port
exempting carriers for negi ence, obfuscating duty of care standards,
The goods were to be delivered to a U.S.
and without choice of rates.
citizen in New York, although the contract of carriage itself had an
express choice of English law whereby the exemption of liability
clauses were valid.2 9 ' In such circumstances, as Zhang has cogently
stated, the stipulation will not be validated where the invasive impact is
to evade U.S. forum law protecting societal interests, and the term is not
adopted in a bona fide and legal fashion.29 2
The Anglo-American traditions reveal a common lineage in that
overriding public policy concerns, derived from effects doctrine, comity
or practical reasons such as restraint of trade, only reach the
justificatory threshold when the impact is sufficiently prejudicial to the
forum society or state.293 It is at this level of prejudice that the interests
of the respective parties are duly overtaken. A delicate balancing
exercise is in operation between individual civil liberties or rights of the
parties set against prophylactic determination of public interest. This
tension was highlighted by Kahn-Freund who asserted, "the strength of
a public policy argument must in each case be directly proportional to
the intensity of the link which connects the facts of the case with this
country." 29 On occasion, the effect on the public interest may be
demonstrated but insufficient to warrant interfering with the parties'
choice. In Vita Foods,2 95 it was stated by Lord Wright that, "public
policy . . . may at times be better served by refusing to nullify a

bargain."296 Comity will only be invoked if it is in the interests of
Anglo-American concerns, through shared goals to maintain friendly
relations with other states, to avoid contravention of such a foreign law
that it will have any effect. 297 Comity was invoked in Ralli Bros,
because enforcement of the contract would have required the court to
order the breach of a foreign law; in Regazzoni contract enforcement
would be seen to be condoning the pu28oseful evasion of a law with
sensitive foreign relations implications. In essence, public policy, as

290. Id. at 414-15.
291. Id. at 414. In terms of the evolving nature of the public policy criterion, see generally
Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169 (1965); Antinora v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 76 Misc. 2d
599 (Monroe Cnty. Ct. 1973).
292. Zhang, supra note 7, at 525.
293. See generallyKincaid, supra note 2.
294. Kahn-Freund et al., supra note 260, at 58; see Holder, supra note 268, at 951.
295. Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277, 293 (Austl.).
296. Id. 15.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 267-270.
298. See Ralli Bros. v. Compafiia Naviera Sota Y Aznar, [1920] 2 K.B. 287 (A.C.) (Eng.);
see generally Regazzoni v. KC Sethia (1947), [1958] A.C. 301 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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Vischer has pointed out,299 nowadays has a primarily negative
character. 300 It is a method whereby the forum can refuse to apply an
otherwise applicable law because it offends against the essential social
or juridical concepts of the forum.30 1
III. THE ENGLISH POSITION

A. English Common Law and the New Regulatory Approach
English law has long-recognized the notion of party autonomy, but
also the idea of a "pactum tacitum, " that, it would control should the
parties have failed to avail themselves of their power to designate the
302
During the course of the nineteenth and twentieth
applicable law.
centuries the English courts developed the doctrine of the "proper law
By this doctrine the choice of law process is broken
of the contract."
down into three stages. First, the parties might make an express choice
of law. In accordance with common law principles derived from the offquoted decision in Vita FoodProducts, the Court will give effect to an
express choice of law as long as it is bona fide, legal and not contrary to
public policy. 304 Secondly, in the absence of an express choice of law
the proper law of the contract may be, "the system of law by reference
to which the contract was made." 5 By this template there is allowance

299. Frank Vischer, General Course on Private International Law, 258 RECUEIL DES
CoURs 9, 165 (1992).
300. See generally Akai Pty, Ltd. v. The People's Ins. Co., Ltd., [1996] 188 CLR 418
(Austl.) (appeal taken from Wales), where public policy was iteratively deployed to support
overriding mandatory law.
301. See generally Vischer, supra note 299.
302. For discussion in relation to English choice of law principles in contract, see
MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 64; NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 64, at 665-67; C.M.V.
CLARKSON ET AL., JAFFEY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 2006); J.G. COLLIER, CONFLICT OF

LAWS 192-93 (3d ed. 2001).
303. NORTH & FAWCETT, supranote 64, at 665-67.
304. See Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277, 1 12 (Austl.).
Note there is no reported case in which an express choice was disapplied on the basis of the
proviso. However, an express choice of Hong Kong Law was set aside in an Australian case,
Golden Acres, supra note 270, which was reversed on appeal on a different point. The setting
aside of Hong Kong law was too wide for the decision. For criticism of Golden Acres, see D.
ST. L. Kelly, InternationalContracts and PartyAutonomy, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 701 (1970).
305. See Bonython v. Commonwealth, [1951] 81 CLR 486, 498 (Austl.). The question in
the case was whether "pounds" meant English or Australian pounds. Id. at 495. This fell to be
decided by the proper law. Id. The word appeared in documents evidencing loans raised by the
Government of Queensland and later taken over by that of Australia. Id. The House of Lords
held that the proper law was Australia. Id. at 500. The House of Lords held that the proper law
was Australian, so "Australian pounds" was what was meant. Id. at 501.
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for the possibility of an implied, rather than express, choice. 306
implied choice may be presaged from an arbitration clause, 3 07 from the
special form of a contractual practice such as use of a particular
standard form, 30 or from a jurisdiction agreement. 309 Third, where an
express or implied choice is lacking, a contract should be governed by
the "objective" proper law-that is the law, "with which the transaction
has its closest and most real connection." 310
As with the test provided by the Second Restatement in the United
States, the proper law approach tries to mesh together optimal policies.
There is the propagation of certainty and reasonable party expectation
through allowing the parties to choose the governing law. The support
given to an express or implied choice of law is consistent with the
principle of party autonomy which underpins the whole of the law of
contract. Additionally, the application of imputed choice, the law of the
country with which the contract is most closely connected, promotes the
interest of the country which is likely to have the greatest interest in the
outcome of the parties' dispute.
The English common law doctrine of "proper law" of a contract was
superceded by statutory framework via The Rome Convention, 3 11 which
was implemented in the United Kingdom by the Contracts (Applicable
Law) Act 1990, which came into force on April 1, 1991 and this in turn
has been supplanted by the recent adoption of the Rome I Regulation. 3 12
The common law rules continue to apply to contracts concluded before
that date, and to contracts and contractual questions which are not
regulated by the Regulation or other statutory provisions.313 Views on
306. See text accompanying supra note 232.
307. See, e.g., James Miller & Partners, Ltd. v. Whitworth St. Estates (Manchester), Ltd.,
[1970] A.C. 583, 603 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation
SA v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A., [1971] A.C. 572 (H.L.) (appeal taken from It.).
308. See Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Ins. Co., [1984] A.C. 50, 61 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.).
[I]f it is apparent from the terms of the contract itself that the parties intended
by it to be interpreted by reference to a particular system of law, their
intention will prevail and the latter question as to the system of law with
which, in the view of the court, the transaction to which the contract relates
would, but for such intention of the parties, have had the closest and most real
connection, does not arise.
Id.
309. See generally Hellenic Steel Co. v. Svolamar Shipping Co., Ltd., [1991] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 370.
310. See Bonython, [1951] 81 CLR 486, at 498.
311. See Rome Convention, supra note 32.
312. See Rome 1, supra note 11.
313. See MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 64, at 355-58.
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the need, or otherwise, for a new legislative response to choice of law in
contract and abrogation of common law structure, have been
splenetically and intemperately expressed by traditionalists. 3 14 The
focus of this criticism has involved the necessity to harmonize choice of
law rules in the field of contract, and the inferiority of the Regulation to
equivalent proper law tests:
The Act replaces one of the great achievements of the English
judiciary during the last 140 years or so, an achievement which
produced an effective private international law of contracts, was
recognized and followed in practically the whole world and has
not at any time or anywhere led to dissatisfaction or to a demand

for reform. 3 15
In truth, despite the ire directed at the legislative reforms, practical
differences in structural approach are more apparent than real and
harmonization has beneficially been engendered within the European
umbrella. Here again, as in the United States, pragmatism has prevailed
over theoretical determinations. The aim of the Rome Convention, and
subsequently of the Rome I Regulation has been to introduce into the
national laws of Member States uniform rules concerning the law
applicable to contractual obligations. 3 16 The Regulation deals with a
number of general issues of private international law, but only so far as
they are linked with the subject-matter of the Regulation in terms of
"contractual obligations." 317 The notion of "contractual obligations,"
314. See generally Lawrence Collins, ContractualObligations-theEEC PreliminaryDraft
Convention on PrivateInternationalLaw, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35 (1990); Mann, The Proper
Law ofthe Contract- An Obituary, 107 L.Q. REV. 353, 353-54 (1991).
315. Mann, supra note 314, at 353-54.
316. Interestingly, work in this area commenced with a proposal in 1967 from the Benelux
countries to the EEC Commission suggesting that there should be attempts to unify private
international law rules throughout the community. One of the areas selected for detailed study
was the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations. Work on a draft
convention started in 1970 and the draft was completed in 1972. Subsequently it became evident
that, though progress on a contractual obligations convention could be made fairly readily, there
was much greater difficulty over non-contractual obligations and it was decided in 1978 to drop
that aspect of the draft convention. A final draft was concluded the following year and it was
opened for signature by governments in Rome in June 1980. Furthermore, it is notable that the
Convention did not come into force until 1991 with the seventh ratification, which was that of
the United Kingdom. The reason for the delay is that it took some eight years to decide what
jurisdiction, if any, the European Court of Justice should have over the Convention, and it was
not until those issues were resolved, late in 1988, that some Member States, the United
Kingdom included, were prepared to give serious thought to the implementation of the
convention. See generally NORTH & FAWCETr, supra note 64.
317. The notion of "contractual obligations," albeit fundamental as stated in Article 1(1), is
not defined in the Regulation. See Rome 1, supra note 11, art. 1(1). Although it does not
encompass tortious obligations, property rights and intellectual property rights, the question of
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albeit fundamental, is left undefined as it is regarded as selfexplanatory. No doubt, it does not cover tortious obligations, property
rights or intellectual property, but the exact boundaries are not
unproblematic and may require future clarification. 3 18 In broad terms,
the Regulation comes into operation whenever a contract-related choice
of law questions arises, "to contractual obligations in civil and
commercial matters," save for matters specifically excluded from its
scope notably revenue, customs and administrative matters. 3 19
Unlike the Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction and judgment
enforcement, which is generally restricted in application to disputes
involving defendants domiciled within the Community, the Rome I
Regulation applies irrespective of the parties' domicile. 320 Therefore,
whilst the former keeps the pre-existing rules of jurisdiction in
operation, the latter is of a universal character and has the effect of
outlawing most of the pre-existing substantive norms. The choice of law
specified by the Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law
of a Member State; in accordance with this provision the governing law
may be English, Chinese or New York, and federal or composite states
which have their own bodies of law in respect of contractual obligations
are equiparated with a "country" (territorial unit) for the schematic
template within the Regulation. Essentially, as Young has stated, it is
self-evident that, "the Rome Convention (now Regulation) is in no way
restricted according to the connection which a contract or the arties to
a contract may have with a state party to the Convention."32 In other
whether it encompasses quasi-contracts or restitution is, however, more complicated. See T. W.
Bennett, Choice ofLaw Rules in Claims of UnjustEnrichment, 39 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 136, 13644 (1990); KAYE, supra note 65, at 100-01; Christopher Forsyth & Philip Moser, The Impact of
the Applicable Law of Contracton the Law ofJurisdiction Under the European Conventions, 45
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1996); F.D. ROSE, RESTITUTION AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1995);

Kleinwort Benson, Ltd. v. Glasgow City Council, [1997] 1 A.C. 153 (appeal taken from Eng.).
There seems little doubt that the notion of "contractual obligations" ought to be given an
autonomous community meaning.
318. See KAYE, supra note 65, at 100-01.
319. See Rome I, supra note 11, art. 1(1). In truth the excluded matters are somewhat of a
rag-bag lacking internal consistency. They embrace: (i) questions involving the status or legal
capacity of natural persons, without prejudice to Article 13, see supra note 11, art. 1(2)(a); (ii)
obligations arising out of family relationships and matrimonial property regimes, see supra note
11, art. 1(2)(b) & (2)(c); (iii) obligations within the purview of negotiable instruments, see supra
note 11, art. 1(2)(d); (iv) arbitration agreements, see supra note 11, art. 1(2)(e); (v) corporate
governance, see supra note 11, art. 1(2)(f); (vi) agency, see supra note 11, art. 1(2)(g); (vii)
trusts, see supra note 11, art. 1(2)(h); and (viii) evidence and procedural concerns, see supra
note 11, art. 1(3).
320. See generally Rome I, supra note 11.
321. See id. art. 2; see generally Halpem & Ors v. Halpern & Anr, [2007] EWCA (Civ)
291 (Eng.); [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 56.
322. James Young, The Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, 1 L. MAR. & COM. L. Q.
314, 315 (1991).
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words, the Convention will, for each Member State which ratifies it, be
worldwide in effect. 323 The choice of law rules in the Regulation replace
whatever are the present contractual private international rules in a
Member State, whether the contract involves other European
324
community states or other countries throughout the world3. It will also
apply to a dispute where the connections are with the territories within a
federation, such as the United States, should that dispute come before
the courts of a Member State of the European Community where the
Regulation is in force. 325
A number of commentators have suggested that the Rome
Convention, and now the Rome I Regulation, have not brought about
significant changes to the structure of pre-existing common law rules,
except in so far as to embody those rules in a statutory form.3 26 This is
true in the sense of replication of the practical scheme of express choice,
implied choice and imputed choice. It would, however, be remiss to
leave an impression that no changes have occurred. The very fact of
giving a definitive statutory wording to these rules has provoked an
altered legal topographical map as the words themselves take on special
significance and become the focus of the dispute.327 The sources to be
consulted for interpretative purposes have also changed. The rules of the
United Kingdom have ceased to be a body of choice of law rules rooted
in a common law tradition shared with Commonwealth countries, and
become instead rooted in a legal European culture, so that English
courts must look to the European Court of Justice and the national
courts of the EC for assistance in preference to those of, for example,
Australia and Canada. 328 In the following part the focus will be to
examine the rationality of ascertainment of the applicable law in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Rome I Regulation. This
is comparatively evaluated against the provisions of the Second
Restatement, and the surprising degree of collinearity is noted, albeit
that demarcations still prevail over objectification of implied choice set
against inferential common purpose.
See MCCLEAN & BEAVERS, supra note 64, at 355-57.
324. Note, as with other E.C. Conventions, an explanatory report on the Rome Convention
by Professors Giuliano and Lagarde was published in the Official Journal and the Act enables
this to be considered in interpreting the Convention. See generally GIULIANO & LAGARDE
REPORT, supra note 10. There is a provision in an appended Protocol, which has, however,
never been brought into effect in the United Kingdom, giving the European Court jurisdiction to
rule on the interpretation of the Convention, and any question of interpretation which is not
referred to the European Court must be determined in accordance with the principles laid down
by, and any relevant decision of, the European Court. Id. at 355.
325. See generally Rome I, supra note 11.
326. See generally Morse, supra note 10; Williams, supra note 10.
327. See generally Young, supra note 322.
328. Id.
323.
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B. The Applicable Law Under the Rome I Regulation
1. Introduction
Both the Convention and Regulation draw a fundamental dichotomy
between the situation where the applicable law is chosen by the
parties,329 and that where in the absence of choice the applicable law is
to be ascertained objectively. 330 In the former situation, the governing
law is associated with the parties' intentions, either expressed or clearly
demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the
case, thereby enshrining the principle of party autonomy, a concept
which is universal throughout the national systems of private
international law within the Community and many other countries. 331
As previously discussed in the preceding part on U.S. choice of law in
contract, in optimal policy terms the manifest benefits of party
autonomy embrace provision of certainty, predictability and upholdin
of legitimate expectations which are essential in commercial matters. 3
In default of a choice the governing law may be determined objectively,
by reference to the country with which the contract is most closely
connected.3 33 The reference to an applicable law under the Regulation,
whether chosen or not, is a reference to the domestic law of the country
in question, excluding its private international law with the
consequence that the doctrine of renvoi has no application.394
Prior to evaluating the aforementioned issues, it is important to
highlight that the Regulation sanctions the operation of depecage, that
is, the application of different laws to different parts of the contract. 33 5
In respect of freedom of choice, the last sentence of Article 3(1)
provides that: "By their choice the parties can select the law applicable
329. Rome I, supra note 11, art. 3(i); see generally MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 64,
at 358.
330. See Rome 1,supra note I1, art. 4; see generally Tang, supra note 216.
331.

See GIULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10, at 15-16; see generally Lando,

supra note 19; Patrick R. Williams, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1986); KAYE, supra note 65, at 147-48; Lando, supra

note 10, at 169-80.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
333. See Rome I, supra note 11, art. 4(3).
334. This is in accordance with Article 20 of the Regulation which provides that, "The
application of the law of any country specified by this Regulation means the application of the
rules of law in force in that country other than its rules of private international law, unless
provided otherwise in this Regulation." Id. art. 20. The position is the same under the English
common law rules on contract choice of law. See, e.g., Re United Railways of Havana and
Regla Warehouses, Ltd., [1960] ch. 52, at 96-97; Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp. v. Kuwait Ins.
Co., [1983] 2 All ER 884, (H.L.) (Eng.); Dimskal Shipping Co. S.A. v. Int'l Transport Workers
Fed'n, [1990] I.C.R. 694 (Eng.).
335. See generally Rome I, supra note 11.
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to the whole or to part only of the contract." 3 36
Pursuant to this provision, parties are given the freedom to select a
law to apply to the whole contract, or select different laws for different
parts of the contract.3 37 Nonetheless, when the parties choose different
laws to apply to different parts of the contract, that "choice must be
logically consistent, in the sense that it must relate to elements in the
contract which can be governed by different laws without giving rise to
contradictions."338 By way of illustration, ddpecage may be logically
consistent where an index-linking clause is made subject to a law
different from that chosen to apply to the rest of the contract, but it may
not be so where the repudiation of the contract for non-performance is
made subject to two different laws, one of the vendor and the other of
the purchaser. 3 In the latter case, both choices will fail and recourse
must be had to the rules on the applicable law in the absence of
choice.3 4 0 Furthermore, where the parties have chosen a law to govern
only part of the contract, such a choice cannot lead to the presumption
that the chosen law should govern the contract in its entirety.3 41 This
presumption might be conducive to error, especially in situations where
the parties had reached agreement solely on a specific part. The law
governing the remainder of the contract must be ascertained by the rules
on the applicable law in the absence of choice.3 42
Where the parties have chosen a law to govern their contract,
whether expressly or impliedly, such a choice is normally upheld. Their
freedom to do so raises a number of issues which will now be
examined. The reflective provisions contained within Articles 3 and 4 of
the Regulation represent the very cornerstone of the new choice of law
regime, and a shift in emphasis from the Convention schematic

template 343
336. See id.; supra note 11, art. 3(1).
337. See id. Note that in relation to scission, Stone asserts that: "the Convention (now
Regulation) also seems impliedly to admit the possibility of incorporation by express reference
of the terms of an enactment from one country into a contract governed by the law of another
country, so as to remain unaffected by the subsequent repeal or amendment of the enactment in
its country of origin." PETER STONE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 236 (1995).
338. See GIULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10, at 17; see also NORTH & FAWCETr,

supranote 64.
339. See FAWCETr ET AL., supra note 32, at 691. For an interesting discussion of party
autonomy and application of scission principles in Chinese law, see Mo Zhang, Choice ofLaw
in Contracts:A Chinese Approach 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 289, 313-15 (2006).
340. See Rome I, supra note 11, art. 4.
341.

See FAWCETT ET AL., supra note 32, at 691; MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 64, at

361-62.
342.

FAWCETT ETAL., supra note 32, at 691; MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 64, at 361-

62.
343. See generally Tang, supra note 216.
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2. Express or Implied Choice of Law
Express or implied choice is governed by Article 3(1) of the new
Regulation which provides that:
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.
The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by
the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By
their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole
or to part only of the contract.344
The rule stated in the above provision simply reaffirms the principle
of party autonomy which has long been embodied in the private
international law of all the Member States of the Community. 34 5 In
terms, however, of implied choice derived from the terms of the
contract or the circumstances of the case, a more restrictive and limited
test has been adopted in extant law.
a. Express Choice
Where the parties have made an express choice of law this applies to
their contract. 46 In the typical run of cases it is a straightforward issue,
cadit quaestio, whether the respective parties have concurred on this
matter, in similar vein to other contractual terms. There will be
exceptional authorities where it is disputed whether a consensus ad
idem has been reached as to choice of law, notably over incorporation of
general terms of business. It is essential that a clear consensus has been
iterated in regard to the relevant term. 347 This was a concern that arose,
inter alia, in Iran Cont'1 Shelf Oil Co. v. IRI Int'l Corp.,348 wherein each
litigant sought to rely on their own idiosyncratic terms and conditions
which were palpably inconsistent, and with a paucity of unequivocal
Unsurprisingly, it was affirmatively stated that the
concurrence.
parties had failed to make a choice of express law reflective of either
Texan or Iranian law. 350 Similarly in Samcrete Egypt Engineers and
344. See Rome I, supra note 11, art. 3(1).
345. The main policy considerations which underlie this principle embrace notions that it
provides the certainty and predictability which are essential elements in commercial contracts.
See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 64, at 552-61; KAYE, supra note 65, at 147-49, Nygh, supra
note 179, at 297; NYGH, supra note 31, at 3-12.
346. See Rome I, supra note 11, art. 3(1).
347. See generally Jonathan Hill, Choice of Law in Contract Under the Rome Convention:
The Approach of the UK. Courts, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325 (2004).
348. Iran Cont'l Shelf Oil Co., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1024 (Eng.).
349. See id. 7.
350. Id.
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ContractorsSae v. Land Rover Exports, Ltd.,35 1 the incorporation of a
choice of law term by the claimant into a draft guarantee, but deleted by
the defendant prior to contractual formation, did not evince any clear
common intention as to joint purpose.3 52
Unlike some national laws relating to contractual obligations, which
historically have limited the freedom of parties' choice to the extent that
the chosen law will only govern the contract where it is connected in
some way with the parties or the contract, Article 3(1) requires no such
connection.3 5 3 By way of illustration,35 4 Article 41 of the Portuguese
Civil Code of 1967, which encapsulated party autonomy upheld the
parties' choice provided that they had a legitimate interest in the
application of that law or that the chosen law showed relevant
connecting elements to the contract.3 55 Moreover, Article 10(5) of the
1974 Introduction to the Spanish Civil Code permitted party autonony,
provided that the chosen law had some connection with the contract.
As previously highlighted, the Second Restatement in the United States
permits autonomy, but subject to displacement where the chosen state
has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there
is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice.35 A different
tradition prevailed under English common law jurisprudence. The Privy
Council in the famous case of Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus
Shipping Co., Ltd.,35 8 upheld a clause referring to English law as the
applicable law to the contract, even though the contract had no
connections with England. 359 Lord Wright maintained that where the
parties make an express choice of law, it is difficult to see what possible
qualifications there could be to effectation.360 Provided that the choice
was bona fide and legal, and there was no reason to avoid it on the
ground of public policy, it should be upheld. 3 6 1 He proceeded to indicate
351. Samcrete Egypt Engineers and Contractors Sae, [2002] 533 EWCA (Civ.) 2019
(Eng.).
352. See generally Iran Cont'1ShelfOil, EWCA (Civ.) 1024.
353. This is subject to a few exceptions under Article 3(1), see supra text accompanying
notes 335-43.
354. See generally Lando, supra note 10.
355. CODIGO CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 41 (1967) (Port.).
356. CODIGO CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 10(5) (1967) (Spain).
357. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 84,

§

187(2).

358. Vita Food Prods., Inc., v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd. [1939] A.C. 277 (Austl). A contract
had been concluded in Newfoundland via a bill of lading covering a shipment of a cargo of
herrings from Newfoundland to New York. Id. at 277. At issue was whether the bill of lading
evidenced an intention of the parties that the contract be governed by English law. Id. at 279.
359. Id. at 290.
360. Id.
361. At common law there is, thus, this suggestion that the parties' choice is restricted by
the requirement that it be "bona fide and legal" and not contrary to public policy. It is not clear
what is meant by this, but left open the possibility of the courts invalidating a choice of law
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further that connection with England was not, "as a matter of principle
essential." 362 Indeed, those familiar with international business
transactions are aware how frequently arbitration in London, and the
application of English law, is incorporated in contracts of such nature,
even where the parties are not English and the transactions are carried
on completely outside England.3 63
The wide freedom of choice under the Rome I Regulation is
desirable. It reflects a liberal Anglo-American traditional heritage in
private international law, and the incremental development of optimal
templates. It allows parties to reach a mutual agreement in respect of a
system of law appropriate for regulating their relations. In reality, the
parties to most international business transactions choose a particular
law which for judicious reasons, will normally be the law of the country
which dominates a particular market. 364
b. Implied Choice
The choice of law by the parties will often be express, but
Article 3(1) of the Regulation recognized the possibility that the parties
may have made a real choice, even though this is not expressly
stipulated in the contract.365 Accordingly, an inference as to the
application law may be drawn provided that the parties' intentions can
be "clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the
circumstances of the case." 366 The newly drafted provision requires that
the choice is "clearly demonstrated," whilst the earlier threshold under
the Rome Convention mandated that it be "demonstrated with
reasonablecertainty."367 A stricter test has, consequently, been adopted
vis-a-vis implied terms, and the European Commission were mindful in
the new enactment of a purported need to standardize variation in
practice between Member States. The central thrust of this particular
reform agenda was identified in the Commission statement that, "the
German and English courts, perhaps under the influence of a slightly
more flexible form of words, and under the influence of their previous
solutions, are less strict about discerning a tacit choice than their
European counterparts."36 8 A panoply of factors have traditionally been
aimed solely at avoiding domestic legislation that would otherwise apply. See CLARKSON &
HILL, supra note 217; COLLINS, supra note 217.
362. Vita FoodProducts,Inc., A.C. 277, at 295.
363. Id.

364.
365.
366.
367.

See generally Bauerfield, supra note 2.
See Rome I, supra note 11, art. 3(1).
Id.
Compare Rome Convention, supra note 32, art. 3(3), with Rome Convention, supra

note 32, art. 3(1). See also GIULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10, at 17.

368. Commission of the European Communities Green Paper on the Conversion of the
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evaluated as part of this derived subjective choice, as adumbrated in the
Aeolian369 by Lord Justice Potter:
The circumstances which may be taken into account when
deciding whether or not the parties have made an implied choice
... range more widely in certain respects than the considerations
ordinarily applicable to the implication of a term into a written
agreement, in particular by reason of the reference in Article 3(1)
to the circumstances of the case.37 0
This principle of an inferred or implied choice is well known in
English law, and is to be found in civil law countries as well. In
adopting a quiescent and sentient touchstone of purposive (subjective)
intent it represents an interim departure point from the U.S. layered
structure contained within the Second Restatement. The latter edifice is
pre-dominantly focused upon either express choice subject to overriding
state interests or non-choice where the "most sigificant relationship"
conceptual lodestar fills the void in section 188. 'Implied choice, as a
derivation of contractual party animus, fills the middle ground vacuum.
The Giuliano-Lagarde Report, which formed the basis of the Rome
Convention schematic template, referred to a number of situations in
which a court may draw an inference as to the parties' intentions.372 The
illustrations provided therein, together with subsequent precedential
authorities, 37 are instructive aids toward teleological interpretation of
the newly drafted Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation.3 74 The contract
may be in a standard form which is governed by a particular legal
system, such as a Lloyd's policy of marine insurance.37 5 This was
significant in Gan Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Tai Ping Insurance
Company, Ltd.,376 where a standard type contact was formed for
Rome Convention of 1980 on the Law Applicable to ContractualObligations into a Community
Instrument and Its Modernisation, at 24, $ 3.2.4.2 (Jan. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Comm'n of the
European Communities Green Paper], availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/
com/2002/com2002_0654en01.pdf.
369. ISS Machinery Servs., Ltd. v. Aeolian Shipping S.A. (Aeolian), [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
641.
370. Id. at 645.
371. See generally Rifhl, supra note 1.
372. GIULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10.

373. See supra text accompanying notes 376-388.
374. Rome I, art. 3(1).
375. This was a typical example of an inferred choice under the pre-existing English
common law rules. Indeed, in Amin Rasheed, [1984] A.C. 50, 61, Lord Diplock held that the
use of a standard Lloyd's SG form evinced the necessary implication that the parties, a Liberian
company and a Kuwaiti insurance company, had intended that English law should apply,
especially since Kuwait had no indigenous law of marine insurance at that time.
376. Gan Ins. Co. v. Tai Ping Ins. Co., [1999] I.L.Pr. 729, 740; see also Tieman v. Magen
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reinsurance purposes between London underwriters and brokers, and the
Court of Appeal concluded that there was an absence of intent to choose
any law beyond English law. A previous course of dealing between the
parties under contracts containing an express choice of law may lead
courts to infer that this choice is to govern a contract from which the
choice of law clause has been omitted, provided that the circumstances
of the case do not indicate a deliberate change of policy by the parties.
Equally, a choice of law may be inferred where an express choice has
been made in a related transaction between the same parties; or where
the contract contains a choice of forum clause, but subject to the other
terms of the contract and all the circumstances of the case; or where the
contract contains a choice of arbitration clause designating the place of
arbitration in circumstances indicating that the arbitrator should apply
the law of that place.
In accordance with pre-existing English common law rules, a forum
or arbitration clause constituted a very strong indication of an implied
choice of law, 377 and remains inferential under extant law. 3 78 Lord
Wilberforce stated in Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A. v.
Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation S.A., 3 79 that such a clause:
must be treated as an indication, to be considered together with
the rest of the contract and relevant surrounding facts. Always it
will be a strong indication; often, especially where there are
parties of different nationality or a variety of transactions which
may arise under the contract, it will be the only clear indication.
But in some cases it must give way where other indications are
clear.3 80
The presence of an English jurisdiction clause (and by implication an
arbitration clause) was treated by Justice Aikens in Marubeni Hong
Kong and South China, Ltd. v. Mongolian Government,3 as a highly
significant inferential consideration in favor of English law, allied to
grave doubts over the efficaciousness of the Mongolian court or legal
382
system to deal appropriately with the disputed guarantee.
A number of similar predilections were at play in the important case
Ins. Co., [2000] I.L.Pr. 517.
377. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 64; NYGH, supra note 31, at 116-18.
378. See McCLEAN & BEEVERS, supranote 64.
379. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A.,
[1971] A.C. 572 (H.L.) (appeal taken from It.).
380. Id. at 144.
381. Marubeni Hong Kong & South China, Ltd. v. Mongolian Gov't, [2002] 2 All E.R.
(Comm.) 873.
382. Id. T 13(3).
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of Egon Oldendorff v. Liberia Corporation,383 where Justice Clarke,
albeit recognizing the purposive approach required to construe
Article 3(1), saw little if any difference between this perspective and
that adopted under the common law. 384 The dispute therein related to
the existence of a well-known English language form of charter-party
between the plaintiffs, a German company, and the defendants, a
Japanese company, whereby the former was to charter, with an option to
purchase from the latter, two vessels to be built by a third party.38 5 The
documents purporting to constitute the contractual agreement expressly
provided for arbitration in London. 386 The plaintiffs contented that the
existence and validity of the contract should be determined by the law
which would govern the contract had it been valid, and that following
the express arbitration clause in favour of London, a choice of English
law could be implied in accordance with Article 3(1)."' On this
contention, Justice Clarke maintained that the party relying on this
provision must demonstrate with reasonable certainty that the parties
have chosen a particular law as the applicable law, and there must be a
388
In
Teal choice which the parties had a clear intention to make.
relied
considerab
addressing the meaning of the disputed provision, he
on the House of Lords decision in the Compagnie d'Armement case,
notably the judgments of Lord Justices Wilberforce and Diplock, to
reject the defendants' argument that a mere arbitration clause in the
contract could not represent the parties' implied choice, and
additionally, that in their view the consensus of the parties must be
established with reasonable certainty, which was patently lacking in this
case.390 In Compagnie d'Armement it was clearly stated by Lord
Diplock that he did not want to throw any doubt on the proposition that
an arbitration clause:
is generally intended by the parties to operate as a choice of the
proper law of the contract as well as the curial law and should be
so construed unless there are compelling indications to the
contrary in the other terms of the contract or the surrounding
circumstances of the transaction. 391

383. Egon Oldendorffv. Liberia Corp. (Oldendorff), [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 380.
384. Id. at 389.
385. Id. at 380-82.
386. Id at 380.
387. Id at 385-86.
388. Id at 387.
389. Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA v. Compagnie d'Armement Maritime S.A.,
[1971] A.C. 572 (H.L.) (appeal taken from It.).
390. Egon Oldendorffv. Liberia Corp. (Oldendorff), [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 380, 387.
391. Compagnie, [1971] A.C. 572, at 120-21. Thus, the presence of an arbitration clause
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In Egon Olendorf- 92 it was judicially determined that it was a
crucial factor that the clause was incorporated in a well-known English
language form of charter-party, which contained standard clauses with
well-known meaning in English law, and this demonstrated with
reasonable certainty that the parties had intended English law to
apply. 393 It was also enunciated by Justice Clarke that having agreed a
"neutral" forum the reasonable inference was that the parties had
intended the forum to apply a "neutral" law. 394 This meant that English
law and not either German or Japanese law was applicable. Apparently,
it was axiomatic, given the causal nexus between neutral forum and
applicable neutral law, that English law was appropriate to their dispute.
According to Justice Clarke, the "strong indication" of English choice
of law, via the English arbitration clause, became an "irresistible
influence" through the overriding facts of the case:
In short, having agreed English arbitration for the determination
in London of disputes arising out of a well known English
language form of charterparty which contains standard clauses
with well known meanings in English law, it is in my judgment
to be inferred that the parties intended that law to apply. Having
agreed a "neutral" forum the reasonable inference is that they
intended that forum to apply a "neutral" law, namely English law
and not either German or Japanese law . . . the parties made a

tacit choice of English law. They thus in effect chose English law
for ... the charterparty. 39 5
A concomitant of the paucity of case law on interpretation of
Article 3(1) implied choice provision is that the decision in Egon
Olendorff becomes of increased significance. In summary, the decision
has replicated the rationale of the common law principles applied in
raises a strong indication on choice of law, although not an irresistible inference. This point was
addressed by Lord Wilberforce who stated:
an arbitration clause must be treated as an indication, to be considered together
with the rest of the contract and relevant surrounding facts. Always it will be a
strong indication; often, especially where there are parties of different
nationality or a variety of transactions which may arise under the contract, it
will be the only clear indication. But in some cases it must give way where
other indications are clear.
Id. at 114.
392. Oldendorff [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 380.
393. Id. at 380.
394. Id. at 390.
3 9 5. Id.
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Compagnie d'Armement despite affirming a purposive approach,
unconstrained by national law rules of construction, and reluctance to
construe the Convention (now Regulation) in a narrow literal way. The
case embodies a search for ascertainment of the tacit agreement of the
parties; it reiterates the significance of the choice of a neutral forum/law
being applied; expressly relies upon the Giuliano-Lagarde Report to
establish a real choice which the parties had a clear intention to make;
and highlights the significance of the parties embracing expressions
with established meanings in English maritime law.
The newly worded provision in Article 3(1) demands that the
inferred choice be "clearly demonstratedby the terms of the contract or
the circumstances of the case."396 It is suggested de novo herein that this
more stringent and restrictive test is embraced by the principles
cogently articulated by Lord Justice Mance in American Motorists
Insurance Company v. Cellstar Corporation.3 97 A direct parallel can be
made at this juncture, and guidance sought as to the meaning of the
clearly demonstrated test, by coalescence with the statements contained
in this particularized English authority. As such, it stands pre-eminently
with Egon Olendorffas key guides in this substantive arena.
The dispute in American Motorists Insurance Company, focused
upon a contested contract of insurance issued by an American insurance
company in Texas (claimant), and negotiated by the first defendant
incorporated in Illinois, but authorized to conduct insurance business in
Texas and with a U.K. subsidiary (the second defendant). 9 8 The Court
of Appeal, the leading judgment provided by Lord Justice Mance,
concluded, inter alia, that the parties had intentionally reached a
consensus in favour of a choice governed by Texan law. 399 The relevant
determinative factors incorporated: negotiation and issuance of the
policy in Texas; that the broker and insurer were Texan; a clause in
favor of a one year time limit for actions mandated by that law; and that
the contract was concluded by the U.S. multinational on behalf of all of
its subsidiaries from its place of business in Texas. 40 0 Of great
importance, however, to future teleological interpretation behind the
purposive intent contained within Article 3(1) is Lord Justice Mance's
articulation of a stricter test, on "of course" straitened rationalization, as
the threshold of imputed choice. The methodology purveyed by Lord
Justice Mance in the important passage below reflects the sense and
meaning of the new "clearly demonstrated" provision, and exemplifies
how it should be elucidated in court:
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Rome I, art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
Am. Motorist Ins. Co. v. Cellstar Corp., [20031 I.L.Pr. 370.
Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 391-392 per Lord Justice Mance.
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[Article 3(1)] does . . . bring to mind the test governing the

implication of an implied term at common law, on the grounds
that it must have been intended or was so obvious that it went
without saying and was one to which the parties would have said
"of course" if anyone had suggested it. The mere fact that it
would be "reasonable" will not suffice.4 0 '
The purposive threshold of implied choice of law, as set about
above, is still subjective in nature as it is viewed through the prism of
the common purpose, animus and consensus of the respective parties.
The stricter test adopted will reduce the variation and diversity in
practice between English courts and other states affected by the
Regulation. There is a point of demarcation from the template adduced
in the Second Restatement in the United States in that the "most
significant relationship" provision set out in section 188 represents a
"contact-counting" objectification of the choice of law process centred
around liberal connecting factors. 402 It is conjoined with party autonomy
to promulgate a two-tier system
rights preserved in section 187
devolved from either express choice of law or no direct choice by the
respective parties. A via media between this dual categorization is
preserved in Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation,4 0 4 facilitating a
subjectified but inferential choice of law, albeit in narrow and straitened
terms, and distilled from the legal prism of common intent.
c. Variance of the Applicable Law
It is noteworthy that the parties' freedom to choose the applicable
law extends to their ability to vary such a choice at any time thereafter.
The principle is governed by Article 3(2) which reads as follows:
The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law
other than that which previously governed it, whether as a result
of an earlier choice made under this Article or of other provisions
of this Regulation. Any change in the law to be applied that is
made after the conclusion of the contract shall not prejudice its
formal validity under Article 11 or adversely affect the rights of
third parties.

401. Id. at 393.
402. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§

188 (1971).

403. Id.
404. Rome I, supra 11, art. 3(1).
405. Id. art. 3(2).
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Whereas the first sentence of Article 3(2)406 provides maximum
freedom as to when the parties can make their choice, whether express
or implied, the second sentence provides a maximum freedom as to the
amendment of a choice previously made. A choice of law can be made
either at the time of contracting, or before or after the conclusion of the
contract. According to the Giuliano-Lagarde Report 407 this choice can
be made even in the course of proceedings, but subject to the national
procedural rules of the forum in relation to cut-off points.
Similarly, a choice of law previously made by the parties can also be
varied after the conclusion of the contract. For instance, the parties may
have agreed at the time the contract was concluded that Spanish law
shall govern any disputes arising thereof. By virtue of Article 3(2) they
have the freedom to agree subsequently that English law shall apply
instead. Equally, they can vary that law again even during the course of
legal proceedings, provided that the national law of procedure of the
forum allows such a variation to be made at that time.4
This liberal approach to variance of chosen law accords with the
requirement of logical consistency. Having accepted the AngloAmerican principle of party autonomy, it is a logical consequence that
the power of the parties should not be limited solely to the time of the
conclusion of the contract, especially when under the Regulation the
requirement of choice of law by the parties may arise both at the time of
the conclusion of the contract and after that time. 409 However, the
Working Group recognized the dangers which may ensue as a result of
allowing variation by the parties. Hence, Article 3(2) contains a
safeguard to the effect that any variation by the parties shall not
prejudice the formal validity of the contract under Article 11 or
adversely affect the rights of third parties. 4 10 The purpose of the
safeguard in relation to the formal validity of the contract is to avoid the
situation whereby a subsequent variation may affect such validity, such
as when the new chosen law contains formal requirements which were
not contained in the law originally applicable. The preservation of third
party rights is designed to protect a third party who may have acquired
some rights as a result of an original choice of law. Thus, any
subsequent change in the applicable law cannot affect such rights.4 1
406. Id.
407. GIULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10.

408. See KAYE, supra note 65, at 157-59; and NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 64.
409. This rule on variation appears to have some support in England; see AUBREY L.
DIAMOND, Conflict ofLaws in the EEC (1979) 32 Cu. LEG. PROB. 155; F. A. Mann, The Time
Element in the Conflict ofLaws, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 217 (1954). For an opposite view, see
FLETCHER, supra note 65, vol. 3; see also NYGH, supra note 31.
410. Comm'n of the European Communities Green Paper, supra note 368; see generally
MCCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 64.

411.

Note that under the pre-existing common law it appeared that the parties could agree

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

63

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3

422

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23

A variation in applicable law under Article 3(2) must occur by
genuine concurrence, and will rarely be invoked by implication or
purposive inference. In the Aeolian, the first contract (contract A)
was expressly governed by Japanese law, and engaged the claimant's
supply of a turbo-charger to the defendant for utilization in their
ships.4 13 The turbo-charger failed to operate as required, and a further
contractual arrangement (contract B) was formed covering the supply
and purchase of relevant spare parts, and contained an English
jurisdiction and choice of law clause.4 14 The contention, inter alia, that
the variance in chosen law for contract B ought to be incorporated by
inferential reference into contract A, despite no evidence of any such
common purpose or intent, was contumeliously rejected by Potter LJ.
on the part of a unanimous Court of Appeal:
[contract B] makes no reference whatsoever to [contract A]. If
the parties had intended to change the proper law of [contract A],
they could expressly so have provided: however, they did not.
There is certainly no room in my view for the implication of such
a term under the principles of English law applicable to the
implication of contract terms, whether on the basis of business
efficacy or the "officious bystander" test.4 15
The provision of freedom of choice inevitably raises the question of
whether such freedom is absolute or whether it should be limited or
restricted in any particular manner. The U.S. experience demonstrates
that party autonomy may be relegated by overriding state interests on
matters which one intended legal system has not left to respective party
intentions. The new Rome I Regulation promotes non-derogable rights
and overriding mandatory provisions as a counter-balance to full choice
in delineated situations.
3. Limitations on Freedom of Choice
Article 3(3) of the Regulation provides that:
to vary an earlier choice, and probably exercise a power to do so conferred on one of them by
the original agreement, but the courts were hostile to clauses where no initial choice was made;
see generally, Armar Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Caisse Algerienne D'Assurance Et De Reassurance
(The Armar), [1980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 450; Dubai Electricity Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (Iran Vojdan), [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 380; Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v.
Bankers Trust, [1989] Q.B. 728.
412. ISS Machinery Servs., Ltd. v. Aeolian Shipping S.A. (Aeolian), [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
641.
413. Id. at 644.
414. Id. at 644-45.
415. Id. at 645.
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Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of
the choice are located in a country other than the country whose
law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice
the application of provisions of the law of that other country
which cannot be derogated from by agreement.4 16
The Giuliano-Lagarde Report 417 explained that the solution adopted
in this provision represents a compromise between two lines of
argument which had been pursued within the Working Group. On the
one hand, certain experts expressed the wish to limit the parties'
freedom of choice where all other connections with the contract were
established within another country.418 On the other hand, other experts,
notably those representing the United Kingdom, expressed the concern
that such a limitation would be too great an obstacle to the freedom of
parties in situations where the choice is made in good faith and capable
of serving interests worthy of protection.4 19 Hence the compromise,
while taking account of the latter concern, ensures that the nonderogable rules of the country, with which all the other elements are
connected, is not prejudiced by the parties' choice of a foreign law.420 A
variety of private or public interests may consequently fall within the
non-derogable rule umbrella: penalty clauses; exemption terms,
employee and consumer protective legislation; and protection of a
myriad of competitive indicators including curial, financial or anti-trust
laws.42 1
The protection of non-derogable rights is severely limited in
application by the irreducible requirement that, "all other elements
relevant to the situation at the time of choice" are located in a country
other than that expressly chosen by the respective parties. 422 There is
contemporaneity herein with the straitened ambit of overriding
mandatory provisions defined in Article 9(1) of the Regulation:
"Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which
is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests,
such as its political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent
that they are applicable to any situation falling within their scope,
irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this
416. See Recital 15 of the Rome I Regulation which asserts that no substantial alteration is
intended to be made to the import of pre-existing law. Rome I, supra note 11.
417. GIULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10; see generally Tillman, supra note 224.
418. GIULIANO& LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10, at 18.

419. Id.
420. Id.
421. See generally Hellner, supra note 86; Chong, supra note 86; MCCLEAN & BEEVERS,
supra note 64.
422. See generally McClean, "De Conflictu Legum" (2000) 282 Hague Receuil Des Cours,
ch. V.
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Regulation."4 23 A classic illustration in English law of such a "strong"
mandatory provision is the control on exemption clauses in disparate
contracts provided by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.424
Section 27(2) of this Act425 makes it clear that these controls will, in
certain circumstances apply despite the parties' choice of a foreign law
to govern their contract, 4 6 to the effect that where the contract is, for all
intents and purposes, English, the parties cannot evade the provisions of
the 1977 Act merely by stipulating that the contract shall be governed
by another system of law. If such a contract were to be litigated in
Germany, for example, the German courts would be directed to apply
the 1977 Act.4 27 A similar international protection is afforded to various
employee rights contained within the purview of the Employment
Rights Act 1996.428

The compromise to party autonomy in the Regulation has a narrow
breadth; non-delegable rules only apply where the focal epicentre and
elements of the contract are wholly extraneous to applicable law, and
even then are limited in effect; and in the case of overriding mandatory
provisions they must reach the high threshold of "crucial" to public
interests as defined. 4 29 This counterpoise is also manifested in the
423. The text will have to be read as excluding rules that only protect a private interest-not
rules that protect both a private as well as a public interest. It is submitted that it will be very
difficult, if not impossible, to identify such rules since the underlying assumption that there is a
contradiction between public and private interests is highly debatable. All public interests are
built upon the interests of individuals, as only individuals exist in the real world. On the other
hand, all private interests, at least those that affect a sufficient number of individuals, can also
be said to be public interests. Hellner, supra note 86, at 459.
424. See Mann, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 661 (1978).
425. Rome I, supra note 11.
426. See id. § 27(2).
This Act has effect notwithstanding any contract term which applies or purports
to apply the law of some country outside the United Kingdom, where (either or
both):
the term appears to the court, or arbitrator or arbiter to have been imposed
wholly or mainly for the purpose of enabling the party imposing it to
evade the operation of this Act; or
(b) in the making of the contract one of the parties dealt as consumer, and he
was then habitually resident in the United Kingdom, and the essential
steps necessary for the making of the contract were taken there, whether
by him or by others on his behalf.
(a)

Id.
427.
428.
429.
the ECJ
Nielsen,

See KAYE, supra note 65, at 239-79.
See Rome I, supra note 11, § 8.
Note that the newly drafted provisions in Article 9(1) of the Regulation derived from
30. See also Ole Lando & Peter Arnt
decision in Arblade, [1999] ECR 1-8453,
The Rome I Regulation, 45 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1687 (2008); Andrew Bonomi,
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Second Restatement in the United States in that party autonomy will not
prevail if the chosen state has "no substantial relationship" to the
respective parties, where no other reasonable basis for the express
choice is manifested, or where there is a 'fundamental" conflict with
the 'policy' of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue. 4 30 The potential
gateways to exclusion of party autonomy are consequently greater in the
United States than at a European level, and embrace wider state interest
considerations. Public policy also remains operable in Anglo-American
traditions as a "last-ditch weapon," 43 1 to exclude application of a foreign
rule that breaches the effects doctrine or international comity
derivations of the forum. It is a method whereby the forum can refuse to
apply an otherwise applicable law because it offends their essential
social or juridical concepts.43 2
Where it does not appear from the facts that the parties had a clear
intention to submit their contract to the law of a certain country, the
rules in Article 4,433 of the Regulation will apply to determine the
applicable law. These provisions form the very cornerstone of the new
schematic template, and bear comparison with section 188 in the U.S.
Second Restatement which is adopted in the absence of choice. The
terms in Article 4 are controversial in a number of respects, and further
interpretative elucidation is urgently required.
4. Absence of Choice
Where the parties have neither expressly nor impliedly chosen a law
to govern their contract, the applicable law is determined objectively in
accordance with Article 4(1), relating to applicable law in the absence
of choice. The new provisions contained in the Rome I Regulation are
predicated on certainty as a primary aim, but facilitate a degree of
flexibility via the escape clause and the closest connection rule. 434 in
contrast with the Second Restatement template set out in section 188,
this new reformulation is more prescriptive and objective in ambit, but
less intuitive or reflective, and founded on spatial territorial connections
with focal epicentres centred around vital precepts of "characteristic
performance," "habitual residence," and "closest connection.' 4 35 it
OverridingMandatoryProvisions in the Rome I Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contracts,
10 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 287, 287 (2008); Hellner, supra note 86, at 461.
430. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 340-41.
431. See Jackson, supra note 199, at 62.
432. See generally 1 Battifol & Lagarde, TraitdDe Droit InternationalePrivd 354 (8th ed.
1993). See supra text accompanying notes 254-301.
433. See generally Tang, supra note 216.
434. See Tang, supra note 217, at 53-54.
435. See Tang, supra note 216, at 795-97.
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remains to be seen whether the modernization and harmonization policy
goals in the new scheme are truly effective, and the significant changes
436
effected may not lead to significant improvements in every case.
Much will depend on future teleological interpretation by the English
and European courts, and whether the displacement provisions to
otherwise hard and fast rules are treated as hard or weak
presumptions.4 3 7
A radical derivation provided by Article 4 is the adoption of a
438
triumvirate layered perspective toward applicable law. The starting
point is a presumptive mechanistic bright-line test for eight different
varieties of contract. 439 Outside the penumbra of these designated
categories of contract, or where the functional ascription of the contract
cuts across more than one hard and fast rule, then focus will be upon the
law of the country where the party required to effect the "characteristic
performance" 440 of the contract has his habitual residence. An explicit
definition for "habitual residence" is consequently established de novo
in Article 19, providing that "[fjor the purposes of this Regulation, the
habitual residence of companies and other bodies, corporate or
unincorporated, shall be the place of central administration"; and "[t]he
habitual residence of a natural person acting in the course of his
business activity shall be his principal place of business",.44 1 In either
situation, the facts are taken as at the time of the conclusion of the
contract which is the relevant point in time.442 It is provided in Article
19(2) that, "[w]here the contract is concluded in the course of the
operations of a branch, agency or any other establishment, or if, under
the contract, performance is the responsibility of such a branch, agency
or establishment, the place where the branch, agency or any other
establishment is located shall be treated as the place of habitual
residence."4 43
Flexibility is retained in the third element of the reformulated test,
via the escape clause provisions on "closest connection."44 4 The
436. Id.
437. Id.; see also Juenger,supra note 19.
438. Tang, supra note 216, at 785-87.
439. Id. at 786. A correlation applies here with the special-situation contract rules
contained in sections 189-197 of the Second Restatement. See supra text accompanying note
215. In this regard American-European law has coalesced vis-a-vis positivistic ascription of
identifiable choice of law rules.
440. See generallyD'Oliveira, supra note 80; see Lando, supra note 19, at 35.
441. Rome 1,supra note 11, art. 19(1).
442. Id. art. 19(3).
443. Id. art. 19(2).
444. Note that according to Young, it was problematic to decipher any identifiable trends in
the traditional English common law approach, which axiomatically placed greater
emphasis on internal features of the contract, specifically terminology, than on relevant
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prescribed applicable law through facilitation of the mechanistic hardand-fast categorization or "characteristic performance"44 5 adoption, may
be flexibly displaced in two situations. A general "escape" clause can be
flexibly deployed to derogate from otherwise applicable law in the
event that it is clear from all the circumstances of the case that the
contract is "manifestly" more closely connected with another country,4 46
or in the scenario that the mechanistic and characteristic performance
tests fail to effectively determine an applicable law than the contract
shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most
closely connected.4 The potential, thus, remains for the "closest
connection" escape device to be applied by English courts predicated on
weak presumptions of tangential connections qua lex fori, and
consequently disregarding otherwise applicable foreign laws. There is
further elaboration below of an effective test, utilized in Scottish law, as
to efficacious deployment of this policy tool in a European perspective
to promote harmonization.4 49
a. Mechanistic-bright-line Tests for Eight Categories of Contract
In a functional modernization of choice of law the new Regulation
sets out eight categories of contract where precise and detailed rules are
applicable. 5 o The policy goals are centred therein on foreseeability,
certainty and upholding legitimate expectations. The new rules, which
are spatially territorial in effect, are as follows: (a) a contract for the sale
of goods shall be governed by the law of the country where the seller
has his habitual residence; (b) a contract for the provision of services
shall be governed by the law of the country where the service provider
has his habitual residence; (c) a contract relating to a right in rem in
immovable property or to a tenancy of immovable property shall be
governed by the law of the country where the property is situated; (d)
notwithstanding point (c), a tenancy of immovable property concluded
for temporary private use for a period of no more than six consecutive
months shall be governed by the law of the country where the landlord
connecting factors like parties' residence. See Young, supra note 322, at 321.
445. See generally D'Oliveira,supra note 80.
446. Rome I, supra note 10, art. 4(3).
447. Id. art. 4(4).
448. See generally Credit Lyonnais v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., [ 1997] 2 Lloyd's Rep. I at
[5] per Hobhouse L.J. (discussing weak displacement provisions in the context of the Rome
Convention).
449. The principles set out below support a "strong displacement" ideology, whereby the
escape devices do not operate simply as a "tie breaker" beyond the eight concrete
categories or "characteristic performance" facilitation; see Caledonia Subsea, Ltd. v. Microperi
SRL, 2003 S.C. 70 (Scot.), as discussed.
450. Rome 1, supra note 11, art. 4(1).
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has his habitual residence, provided that the tenant is a natural person
and has his habitual residence in the same country; (e) a franchise
contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the
franchisee has his habitual residence; (f) a distribution contract shall be
governed by the law of the country where the distributor has his
habitual residence; (g) a contract for the sale of goods by auction shall
be governed by the law of the country where the auction takes place, if
such a place can be determined; and (h) a contract concluded within a
multilateral system which brings together or facilitates the bringing
together of multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial
instruments, as defined by Art 4(1), point (17) of Directive 2004/39/EC,
in accordance with non-discretionary rules and governed by a single
law, shall be governed by that law.4 5 1
In a number of respects the concrete and rigid formula prescribed by
the eight mechanistic rules above simply reflects the traditional
"characteristic performance" test previously determinative, notably in
the context of sales, service and franchise contracts. The governing
propagation of the seller, service provider, and franchisee may be
rendered otiose in real effect as it simply mirrors the focal epicentre of
these contracts, and consequently the "true" characteristic performer.4 5 2
Mighty labors may have given birth to a mouse! Notwithstanding this
criticism, classification difficulties will still be operative, and a subtle
nuanced approach will have to be considered by English courts charged
with determination of whether a contract falls square within the purview
of a bright-line hard-and-fast rule. This runs counter to the overall
reform aims of certainty, ease of application and harmonization.4 5 3 The
new rules are open to criticism in terms of "separateness" and
"distinctiveness." 4 4 Consider, by way of illustration, the dilemmatic
choices engendered by an I.T. contract engaging a fusion of software
packages and service facilitators. A demarcation dispute on
classification may prevail as to whether the "essence" of the agreement,
the focal cornerstone, is embodied by the sale of goods or tantamount to
services via the software providers. Equally, a joint venture agreement
may raise the spectre of a number of separate paragraphs within
Article 4(1) subject to potential ascription, and again classification
issues are engaged with nuanced subjective evaluations.4 5 5
451. See generally Tang, supra note 216; Tang, supra note 217; MCCLEAN & BEEVERS,
supra note 64.
452. See CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 217, at 186-89; see generally GIULIANO &
LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10.

453. See generally Tang, supra note 216; Tang, supra note 217.
454. Id.
455. Note a limited degree of guidance is provided by Recital 17 of the Rome I Regulation,
which states:
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Intangible problems may coalesce together within the eight separate
paragraphs of the reformulated Article 4(1). An exclusive distribution
agreement will, prima facie, be governed by the law of the country
where the distributor has his habitual residence. The manufactured
goods, however, may be of a highly specialized and particularized
nature, and so performance by the manufacturer may be pre-eminently
significant in their contract consequently adducing an inappropriate
rule-selection adaptation.4?6 Characteristic performance as an
overarching conceptual test has not been totally supplanted by the new
reformulations, merely held in abeyance, as it falls for evaluation within
Article 4(2), and earlier precedential authorities remain significant as
future signposts.
b. The Characteristic Performance Test
Article 4(2) which incorporates a general presumption applicable to
a number of disparate contracts, states that:
Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the
elements of the contract would be covered by more than one of
the points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the contract shall be governed
by the law of the country where the party required to effect the
characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual
*457
residence.
The concept of "characteristicperformance" has Swiss derivations,
and quintessentially identifies the "true seat" of the contractual
agreement. 4 58 The presumptive test was not defined within the
parameters of the Convention, and the Rome I Regulation merely
advances a vague contention in Recital 19 that the characteristic
As far as the applicable law in the absence of choice is concerned, the concept
of "provision of services" and "sale of goods" should be interpreted in the
same way as when applying Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 441 2001 in so far
as sale of goods and provisions of services are covered by that Regulation.
Although franchise and distribution contracts are contracts for services, they
are the subject of specific rules.
Rome I,supra note 11, (17).
456. Pre-existing authorities support application of a choice of "manufacturers" law in such
a context, as "supply of goods" is tantamount to the "essence" of the agreement. AmmannYanmar S.A. v. Zwaans BVA, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
civ., Nov. 23, 2003, Bull. civ. I, No. 237 (Fr.); Print Concept GmbH v. GEW (EC), Ltd., [2001]
EWCA (Civ) 352 (Eng.).
457. Rome I, supra note 11, art. 4(2).
458. Supra notes 80-82.
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performance of the contract, "should be determined having regard to its
centre of gravity." The Guiliano-Lagarde Report 459 maintained that
submission of the parties to the law appropriate to the characteristic
performance defines the connecting factor of the contract from the
inside, and not from the outside by elements unrelated to the essence of
the obligation such as the nationality of the contracting parties or the
place where the contract was concluded. In addition, the Report asserted
that it is possible to relate the concept of characteristic performance to
the idea that this performance relates to the function which the legal
relationship involved fulfils in the economic and social life of any
country. 46 The concept of characteristic performance essentially links
the contract to the social and economic environment of which it will
form a part.4 6 1 In Kaye's view, however, reference to the "essence of the
obligation" and "essential links" harbor that the policy approach to be
adopted is that of identifying the obligation whose character is the
overwhelming feature of the contract, notably that which, "involves
activities which are called upon in society and commerce as being
essential to the maintenance and development of the fabric of national
and international socio-economic co-existence, including the channels
of finance." 462 By way of illustration, in bilateral contracts the counterperformance by one of the parties which usually takes the form of
money payment, is not the characteristic performance. 463 Rather, it is
the performance for which the payment is due, such as delivery of
goods, the provision of a service, insurance, banking operations, and
security, which constitutes the socio-economic function of the
*464
transaction.
In a great number of contracts the characteristic performance will
present no difficulty, and in this regard the earlier mechanistic
provisions in the Regulation are an unnecessary adjunct to extant law.
For instance, in the Dutch case of Machinale GlasfabriekDe Maas BV
v. EmaillerieAlsacienne SA, 465 a contract for the sale of goods between
the plaintiff, a Dutch seller, and the defendant, a French buyer, was held
to be governed by Dutch law on the basis that the characteristic
performance was the plaintiffs obligation to deliver the goods. Since it
had its place of establishment in the Netherlands at the time the contract
was made, the applicable law was the law of that country in accordance

459. See GiULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10, at 20.

460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

Id.
Id.
See KAYE, supra note 65, at 180.
Id.
Id.
Machinale Glasfabriek de Maas BV v. Emaillerie Alsacienne SA, [1984] E.C.C. 123.
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with imputed choice.4 6 6 Nevertheless, there are some commercial
contracts in which the characteristic performance cannot be easily
ascertained, for example a contract between an issuing and confirming
bank in connection with letters of credit. Who is to affect the
characteristic performance in this typical financial situation? A putative
search is engaged to identify the "true seat" of the agreement.
The above question was addressed by the English court in Bank of
Baroda v. Vysya Bank.4 6 7 V, an Indian Bank with no branch in England,
was instructed by an Indian merchant to issue a letter of credit in favor
of G, an Irish company with an office in London, in respect of the
import of a cargo of pig iron. 6 B, another Indian bank with an office in
London, confirmed the credit in London and paid the beneficiary, G, on
tender of the documents which were then sent to India.4 6 9 V then
withdraw the authorization to reimburse B on the grounds that there had
been frauds in the contract of sale and that the documents did not
conform to the credit. 4 70 On the question of which law governed the
contract between V and B, the latter argued that the characteristic
performance of the contract was B's confirmation to the credit and the
honouring of the liability accepted thereby. 47 1 V, on the other hand,
contended that B's argument failed to distinguish the contract between
them from the contract between B and the beneficiary.4 72 Thus, the
characteristic performance was in V's obligation to pay B upon
presentation of confirming documents.4 7 3 Following a brief exposition
of the relevant imputed provisions, Justice Mance, reached the
conclusion that, since the relationship between an issuing bank and
confirming bank is one of agency, the characteristic performance of this
contract was the confirmation and its honouring of the obligations by B
in relation to the beneficiary.4 74 As for the liability on the part of the
issuing bank to reimburse the confirming bank, this did not itself
466. See NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 64. Note that the Dutch courts applied Article 4(2)
prior to the coming into force of the Convention because its provisions had been incorporated as
part of the Dutch national rules of private international law.
467. Bank of Baroda v. Vysya Bank, [1994] (Q.B.) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 87 (Eng.). This case
was mainly concerned with service of the writ outside the jurisdiction under the old Order 11,
rule 1(1) (d) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, which allowed such jurisdiction to be conferred
on the ground, inter alia, that the contract is governed by English law. CPR Rule 6.20; see
generally C. G. J. Morse, Letters of Credit and the Rome Convention, 1994 LLOYD'S MAR. &
COM. L.Q. 560 (1994).
468. Bank ofBaroda, [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 87, at 41.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 48-51.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 51-55.
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characterize the contract, but rather was consequential on its
character. 475 Further confirmatory support for such an outcome 476 was
apparently provided by the Giuliano-Lagarde Report, in particular the
reference therein to an agent instructed to undertake his activity in a
particular country. The characteristic performance of such a contract is
that performed by the agent. By way of analogy, although not a mirrorimage of the actual dispute,4 7 7 Justice Mance also found guidance in the
proposition that the intrinsic performance characteristic of a guarantee is
always embodied by the guarantor's performance. Accordingly the
imputed presumption pointed toward English law as the applicable law,
because the place of business of B, the party who was to affect the
characteristic performance, was London.
An Anglo-centric perspective has been generally adopted toward the
characteristic performance test in pre-Regulation authorities. 479 in
tandem, another distinctive feature has been adducement of a weak
presumption theory, allowing governance of the "closest connection"
escape device, and consequential adoption of English law.4 80 In Print
Concept,48 1 the "real meat" of the transaction, and characteristic
performance of the disputed agreement according to Lord Justice
Longmore on behalf of a unanimous Court of Appeal, focused upon the
role of the English supplier and not the German distributor; 48 2 in Iran
Continentaf83 the key focal epicentre of the contract was conducted via
the defendant's place of business in London which was more than a
mere conduit of information; 484 and in Samcrete,48 5 Lord Justice Potter
in the appellate court gave pre-eminent effect to English law invoked on
"closest connection" displacement grounds as place of payment under
the guarantee and place of delivery of the goods under the
distributorship agreement.486 A central tenet of pre-Regulation judicial
475. Id.

476. Id. at 92. See generally Sierra Leone Telecomm. Co. v. Barclays Bank Plc., [1998] 2
All E.R. 821 (Eng.) (for characteristic performance in relation to a bank account).
477. That is a confirming bank does not act as guarantor of the issuing bank, but assumes
separate liabilities in identical terms. Am. Motorist Ins. Co. v. Cellstar Corp., [2003] I.L.Pr. 370.
478. In the context of counter-guarantees, see Wahda Bank v. Arab Bank Plc., [1999]
EWCA (Civ.) 1599, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 470 (Eng.); see generally Niamh Moloney, Choice
ofLaw Rules and Trade Finance, 1997 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 344 (1997).
479. CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 217; Hill, supra note 347.
480. Hill, supra note 347, at 346-50.
481. Print Concept GmbH v. GEW (EC), Ltd., [2001] EWCA (Civ) 352 (Eng.).
482. Id. at 358.
483. Iran Cont'l Shelf Oil Co. v. IRI Int'l Corp., [2002] CLC 372 (Q.B.) (McCombe J.)
(Eng.), rev'd, [2002] EWCA (Civ.) 1024, [2002] CLC 696 (Eng.).
484. Id. 65.
485. Samcrete Egypt Eng'rs & Contractors SAE v. Land Rover Exps., Ltd., [2001] EWCA
(Civ.) 2019, [2002] CLC 533 (Eng.).
486. Id. 45.
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authorities has been displacement of the characteristic performance
presumption where there has been a dissonance between location of the
characteristic performer's principal place of business, and the spatial
identification of the place of characteristic performance itself.48 The
outcome has been a shift to apply "home" law qua governing lexfori.
5. A Critique of the Characteristic Performance Presumption
The presumption in favour of the law of the party who is to render
the characteristic performance has been strongly criticized, and has been
described as a "novel and cumbersome provision" which is an
"unnecessary insertion" into the Convention (now Regulation).488 For
some the presumption is tolerable only because they believe that it is
virtually neutralized by the escape device presented by the "closest
connection" safeguard. It has been stated that, "[i]n many instances it
is doubtful which particular performance is the characteristic one, as is
true, e.g., in the case of barter transactions, contracts with publishers,
...

distributorship

agreements

[and

negative

declarations

on

competition.]" 490 "Moreover, in complex situations (as, for instance,
corporate acquisitions . . . ) the simplistic 'solution' of exalting one
performance over another as the "most characteristic" does not
work." 49 1 Worse yet, according to Juenger, this focal epicentre
ascription "capriciously" confers a choice of law privilege by invoking
the home-state of those who enjoy particular expertise because they
habitually supply goods and services in international transactions.4 92
If the object is to identify the society which will be most affected by
the contract, it has been suggested that it is not obvious that payment of
money is any less socially important than, for example, providing goods
under a sale of goods contract.4 9 3 Another difficulty, applicable to both
the Convention and new reformulation in the Regulation, 494 is that both
parties may be required to do something other than pay money, as in a
contract of barter.4 95 It will be necessary to establish, by precedent,
categories of contracts with the characteristic performance identified for

487.
488.

See CLARKSON & HILL, supranote 217.
COLLIER, supra note 302.

489. See generally Collins, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS, supra note 10, ch. 9.
490. Juenger, supra note 19, at 205.
491. Id.
492. Friedrich K. Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 385
(1994).

493. D'Oliveira, supra note 80, at 310.
494. Tang, supra note 216, at 787.
495. NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 64, at 535.
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each, a process foreign to the common law.4 96 It is not clear what
criteria would be used to identify the characteristic performance in each
category.4 9 7 The idea of social or economic importance, contained in the
Report itself,498 has been criticized as being so vague as to be little
guide.49 9 In any case complex contracts may be impossible to fit into a
category. Furthermore, according to Blom:5 o
The "characteristic performance" presumption does tend
generally to favor the interests of the stronger party to the
contract, the one who sells the goods, provides the services, lends
the money, and so forth. He will enjoy the convenience of having
his own law govern the agreement, and, if he makes contracts
with persons resident in various foreign countries, he will also
derive the benefit of having a single law apply to all these
agreements. 0 2
Despite these perceived weaknesses of the characteristic
performance test, and entrenched views, there is support for the idea of
a rebuttable presumption to connect a contract with a particular country,
and for the view that the notion of characteristic performance is
potentially useful in establishing such a presumption. 503 On balance, the
presumption is beneficial and serves a useful purpose, especially when
applied by English courts in favor of a "strong presumption" of
adoption, and only displaced by the escape device flexibility of "closest
connection" in limited circumstances. A universal formula for effective
juridical precepts of suitable displacement, derived from Scottish law, is
set out at the conclusion of this section for potential future
signposting. 0 4 An optimal formulation of choice of law in contract
needs to consider goals of convenience and business efficacy, as well as
certainty and predictability. A fixed and definite perspective is
adventitious, not a vague and inflexible choice of law rule. If certainty
is to be enhanced our rule should point to the law of the country to
which one of the parties belongs though, of course, some method of
496. D'Oliveira, supra note 80, at 317.
497. See Schultz, The Concepts of CharacteristicPerformance, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS,

supranote 10, at 186.
498. GIULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10, at 20.

499. D'Oliveira, supra note 80, at 321.
500. See Pryles, An Australian Perspective, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at

329. See also Juenger, The EEC Convention: An American Assessment, in CONTRACT
CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 301.

501.
502.
503.
504.

Blom, supra note 17, at 187.
Id.
See Jaffey, supra note 83, at 546-47.
See Caledonia Subsea, Ltd. v. Microperi SRL, 2003 S.C. 70 (Scot.).
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identifying which party must be contained in the rule. In the absence of
an express governing choice, the main consideration should be the
interests of the parties, involving justice as between them, certainty and
predictability, as well as business efficacy and convenience. These can
best be attained, in general terms, by a fixed choice of law presumption
pointing to the law of the country to which an identifiable party
belongs.os In this respect benefits inure by the application of the law of
the party who renders the characteristic performance. Arguably an
effective ground of convenience for choosing between the parties' laws
is to select the law of the party who is more likely, or is likely more
often, to have to ascertain and act on rules of law in the course of his
performance: the party whose role under the contract is more active and
substantial, whose performance and the obligations in relation to it are
the more complex. In the normal run of events this will equate to the
law of the party who is to render the characteristic performance.5 06 This
might be economically more efficient in reducing the costs of the
transaction. Although the Convention did not itself define the notion of
characteristic performance, and the new Regulation follows suit beyond
the limited statement in Recital 19, the Report explains it as follows:
Identifying the characteristic performance of a contract obviously
presents no difficulty in the case of unilateral contracts. By
contrast, in bilateral (reciprocal) contracts whereby the parties
undertake mutual reciprocal performance, the counterperformance by one of the parties in a modem economy usually
takes the form of money. That is not, of course, the characteristic
performance of the contract. . . the delivery of the goods, the

granting of the right to make use of an item of property, the
provision of a service, transport, insurance, banking operations,
security, etc., which usually constitutes the centre of gravity and
the socio-economic function of the contractual transaction.
The effect is that in the traditional bilateral contract whereby one
individual is to pay money as the price for the provision of goods or
services, it is the provision of the goods or the service which is the
characteristic performance. 508 As Jaffey has intimated, in a contract of
sale of goods, the seller's law would govern: in a contract of hire or
hire-purchase, the law of the lettor; in a contract of insurance, the law of
the insurer; agency, the law of the agent; banking, the law of the banker;
505.

Jaffey, supra note 83, at 547.

506.

See OLE LANDO, 3 THE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 24

(1976).
507.

GIULIANO & LAGARDE REPORT, supra note 10, at 20.

508. Jaffey, supra note 83, at 548.
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a building contract, the law of the builder; and a guarantee, the law of
the guarantor. 509 The supposition is that in these discrete categories it is
the party whose performance is the characteristic one who has the more
active role to play and, thus, it may reasonably be supposed, is the more
likely to need to consult the law during performance. The concomitant
is that it is generally reasonable to prioritize their convenience in being
able to rely on their forum's law, subject, of course, to displacement
where "closest connection" is elsewhere. Overall the characteristic
performance strong presumption does support convenience and business
efficacy despite hostile criticism by some academicians that it failed
users of the law in its lacuna to clearly provide the answer for the most
common types of international contract. These answers were apparent,
and, as such, the mechanistic hard-and-fast provisions in the new
Regulation were generally rendered otiose by the extant characteristic
performance test. It is adventitious to retain this test, albeit in more
straitened circumscribed denouements as a default threshold.
C. Escape Devices and the Closest Connection Test
The new Regulation facilitates a flexible escape mechanism, albeit in
a limited ambit, from the applicable law otherwise designated by the
mechanistic hard-and-fast rules contained in paragraph 1 of Article 4, or
the characteristic performance presumption set out in paragraph 2. A
derogation can occur if the contract is "manifestly " more closely
connected with another country (paragraph 3), or in the event that
paragraphs 1 and 2 are not determinative then the contract shall be
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely
connected (paragraph 4). The closest connection must be natural and
obvious, with the "manifestly" higher threshold set out in the
reformulated test consequently indicating a more constrained flexible
displacement device and strong presumption displacement of otherwise

derogable rules. 5 10
The new reformulations in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 4
consequently have the effect of giving judges a margin of discretion as
to whether a set of circumstances exist in order to justify the rebuttal of
the presumptions. Clearly, the power to disregard the presumptions
provides flexibility, and is intended to apply where, for example, the
presumptions lead to a subcontract being governed by a law different
from that governing the principal contract between the contractor and
the employer.51' In such a situation it might be more appropriate to
509. Id.
510. See generally Tang, supra note 216 (explaining the characteristics of the closest
connection); Hill, supra note 347; McCLEAN & BEEVERS, supra note 64.
511. NORTH & FAWCET7, supra note 64, at 535.
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apply the same law to both contracts. Indeed, this was precisely the
conclusion which Justice Mance reached in Bank of Baroda v. Vysya
Bank, Ltd.,5 12 in relation to the contract between V and the beneficiary.
It may be recalled that in this case, V had requested B to confirm a letter
of credit which the latter confirmed in London, and paid the beneficiary
on the tender of the documents. 1 On the question of which law
governed the contract between V and G, the beneficiary, the learned
judge held that the imputed choice presumption pointed to Indian law as
the place of central administration of V, the party who was to effect the
characteristic performance.5 14 Nonetheless, this would have meant that
two different legal systems would govern two contracts relating to the
same provision of credit. In his view, this was a classic demonstration
of the need and appropriate usage of an escape device provided by the
flexibility of a governing "closest connection" test.5 15 Hence, the
conclusion that the letter of credit between V and G was also governed
by English law.5 16 Another pertinent illustration of the ambit of the
exclusion promised for in Article 4 paragraphs 3 and 4 would be a
contract for the sale and lease-back of equipment. In such a scenario
that presumption in favor of the characteristic performer's residence
would be excluded where such performance cannot be validly
determined."
The difficulty, of course, is to try and reconcile when courts ought to
deploy the flexible escape device to supplant either mechanistic
presumptions or the characteristic performance template. A key
indicator that jurisprudence has suggested to salve this dilemma has
focused upon the requirements of commercial efficiency that is
objectively judged by reference to the expectations of those in the
relevant market.518 By application of this "commercial efficiency"
determinant, a "closest connection" test was supererogatory in Bank of
Baroda v. Vysya Bank, Ltd., because business legitimacy indicated that
the law governing a letter of credit should be the same irrespective of
whether payment is sought from the issuer or the confirming bank, an
outcome which imputed choice would have precluded. In contrast, in

512. Bank ofBaroda, [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 87.
513. Id. at 91.
514. Id. at 92.
515. Id. at 91-94.
516. Id. at 93.
517. See Young, supra note 322, at 322 (suggesting that a distribution agreement may also
provide another cogent example of where there will be no single characteristic performance).
But see STONE, supra note 337 (asserting that it seems likely that the marketing activities of the
distributor should be regarded as characteristic of the contract).
518. See Richard Fentiman, Commercial Expectations and the Rome Convention, 61(1)
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 50 (2002).
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Sierratel v. Barclays Bank Plc.,519 the litmus paper test of "commercial
efficiency" determined that the law governing a bank account should be
that applicable at the branch where it is held, an outcome effected by the
characteristic performance mandate.52o This replicated the perspective
of the Dutch Hoge Raad in Socidtd Nouvelle des Papiteriesde l'Aa SA
v. B V MaschinefabriekBOA, 521 when again characteristic performance
prevailed, apparently on the premise that it was commercially preferable
that cross-border sales are governed by the supplier's law. 22 It also
mirrored the statements in the Report on the Convention that Article 4
in reflecting the traditional rules of most Contracting States, is
concerned with localizing contracts in their "social and economic
environment. 5 2 3
It is submitted that the "commercial efficiency " requirement, as
objectively determined by reference to relevant market expectations,
fails to provide a full panacea to the strong/weak displacement threshold
for "closest connection" in cases involving non-traditional types of
contract, or where evidence of market expectations is unclear. In terms
of the new provision in paragraph 3 any displacement should only occur
where the closest connection is "manifestly " with another country. A
new approach is consequently proposed herein as to proper ascription of
this novel escape device. It is suggested that a stronger threshold test
applies to displacement of the presumptions, built upon twin pillars of
judicial reasoning. First, in such circumstances, the court needs to
concentrate focus upon solipsistic determination of the contract's
"centre of gravity" which represents the "true seat" of the agreement.
Secondly, an apposite test to "manifest closest connection," and
impacted "centre of gravity" can be derived from the strong
presumption theory in favor of characteristic performance (hard and fast
rules) advanced by Lord President Cullen in the Scottish Court of
Session in Caledonia Subsea, Ltd v. Microperi SRL,5 24 a project
management dispute over services utilization of a Scottish company and
an Italian company subcontracted to facilitate an oil pipeline in
Egyptian territorial waters. The otherwise governing presumption will
only be displaced by closest connection predicated on contractual
"centre of gravity,"25 in circumstances demonstrating a "clear
519. Sierra Leone Telecomm. Co. v. Barclays Bank Plc., [1998] 2 All E.R. 821 (Eng.).
520. Id. at 5.
521. Soci6t6 Nouvelle des Papeteries de L'Aa Sa v. BV Machinefabriek BOA, H.R. 25
Sept. 1992, NJ 750 (PlaintifflDefendant) (Neth.).
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Caledonia Subsea, Ltd. v. Microperi SRL, 2003 S.C. 70 (Scot.).
525. Id. T 28, 30. See generally Hill, supra note 347; Tang, supra note 216; Tang, supra
note 217; CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 217.
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preponderance of factors in/avour of another country."526 This "clear
preponderanceoffactors"52 test reflects the more constrained nature of
flexibility contained within the new Regulation provisions, and offers
an interpretative way forward for English courts.
A "centre of gravity" escape device technique, formulated upon a
"clear preponderance of factors" 528 balancing-test is arguably
indicative of the approach mandated in the important case of Definitely
Maybe (Touring), Ltd v. Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur GmbH,1
involving the notorious Mancunian "band of brothers" known as
"Oasis."0 The pop band, Oasis, represented by the English claimants
had agreed to appear at concerts in Germany, but the German
defendants, the promoters, withheld payment when the band performed
without Noel Gallagher. 53 1 At issue, was whether the English courts had
jurisdiction under Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention as they would
if the defendant's obligation to pay was to be performed in England-if
so the claimants could sue for the outstanding balance. 5 32 English and
German domestic law differed on place of payment--creditor's
residence under English provisions, but debtor's domicile under
German law and if applicable excluding English jurisdiction.5 3 3 The
application of the imputed choice presumption under the Convention
provisions indicated English law as governing as the characteristic
performer because the suppliers of the band's services were English.5 3 4
However, Justice Morrison held that this was a case where the
characteristic performance presumption should be displaced by the
flexibility of closest connection as German law was better connected.5 3 5
The defendants staged the concerts in Germany, which was where Oasis
performed, and this it is submitted reflected the contract's centre of
gravity derived from evaluation of a clear preponderance of relevant
factors.536 It is reflective of the need to deconstruct the new Regulation
provisions through the prism of commercial efficiency allied with the
two-point scheme advanced herein.
In essence, while Article 4 gives effect to market expectations, as
suggested by commercial considerations, where these expectations are
526.
527.
528.
529.
(Eng.).
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.

CaledoniaSubsea, Ltd., 2003 S.C. 70, 41.
Id.
Id.
Definitely Maybe, Ltd. v. Marek Lieberberg GmBH, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1745, 1746
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1747.
Id. at 1750.
Id.
Id. at 1748.
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lacking, then "the balance of factual connection" takes centre-stage.53 7
The judiciary, at least in terms of the flexibility provided by the escape
mechanism engendered by a closest connection test, are to a degree
thrown back to determination on an essentially ad hoc basis as to
whether to apply a strong/weak displacement theory. They ought to
adopt a centre of gravity analysis extrapolated by examination of a
threshold of clear preponderance of relevant factors.5 38 This to a degree
mirrors the "most significant relationship test" adduced in section 188
of the Second Restatement in the United States, and myriad of factor
counting contained therein, deployed also with the "interest" provisions
of section 6.539 By chance, rather than design, Anglo-American law has
broadly moved in step on contract choice of law. A further overlap
exists in that the inter-play and exact demarcation between the novel
Article 4 paragraphs of the new Regulation, as with sections 187(2), and
188 of the Second Restatement, have yet to be fully or properly
determined. The key elements of "commercial efficiency" and "centre
of gravity" requirements to solve the applicable law dilemma remain in
gestation.

IV. CONCLUSION
A significant degree of replication now applies to applicable law
There is a
selection in contract on both sides of the Atlantic.
the Second
between
perspectives
methodological
broad
in
consensus
specific
the
Restatement and new Rome I Regulation in terms of
presumptions that are adopted to promulgate certainty, predictability
and ease of application. These concrete rules protect legitimate party
expectations. The prescribed rules may be supplanted in limited
exceptional situations to allow beneficial, flexible displacement, to
protect commercial efficiency, localize the central gravity of a contract,
and consequentially prevent unfairness, inappropriate outcome
resolution and capricious injustice.
It is true to say that for Anglo-American choice of law in contract
the autonomy of the parties is now generally recognized.5 4 1 In pragmatic
terms this may be seen as the necessary accompaniment of the
globalization of international trade and commerce. 542 Express choice of
governing law lies at the very cornerstone of both the new Rome I
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.

Fentiman, supra note 518, at 52.
See Caledonia Subsea, Ltd. v. Microperi SRL, 2003 S.C. 70 (Scot.).
See supra text accompanying notes 230-34.
RUh, supra note 1, at 840.
See NYGH, supra note 31.
Id.
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Regulation in Article 3 and the Second Restatement in section 187. This
freedom of the parties to choose the applicable law, whilst very broad,
is not absolute. Several other legal systems may have a claim to be
considered, even if the parties have purported to exclude those laws.
The state interests of the law of the forum may demand attention, which
may deny or restrict the freedom of choice of the parties to override the
provisions of the chosen law through the application of its mandatory
rules in the international sense. There may be other legal systems, which
have a close relationship with the transaction or its performance, and
may in certain circumstances, have a claim to be considered. These
mandatory rules and public policy concerns are accommodated in both
the Rome I Regulation and the Second Restatement.
The mandatory rules and public policy agenda partially represents a
fudged compromise between various schools of thought about choice of
law method, between the demands of theoretical consistency, and those
of conformity to established patterns of judicial decision-making.
International comity will be invoked, if it is in the interests of AngloAmerican concerns, through shared goals to maintain friendly relations
with other states, in order to avoid contravention of such a foreign law
that it will have any effect. Public policy is shrouded in this context
with a primarily negative hue. It is a characterization method whereby
an engaged forum can refuse to apply an otherwise applicable law
because it offends against the essential social or juridical concepts of the
forum. As stated herein, the adoption of public policy interest has been
applied in Anglo-American tradition to override the effectual terms of
the proper law, which subjugates policy concerns, not the overarching

choice itself.5 43
The main story overall has been one of the triumph, in general terms,
of the will of the party as Savigny's legacy has taken hold.5 44 It is
contended that there are certain primary goals of any system, which
purports to give guidelines in the area of choice of law in contracts.
Rules need to be promulgated, which promote predictability and
uniformity in result, regardless of the place of litigation, thus allowing
the parties to be relatively certain about their rights and obligations.
This is especially true since there is a greater expectation of litigation
with regard to commercial transactions than in other areas of the law.
Furthermore, there is a need for rules, which are available and simple
enough for courts and lawyers to interpret and comply with, but not so
overbroad as to eclipse interests of states, the multinational system, or
the parties. In tandem there are goals of upholding parties' reasonable
543. See supra text accompanying notes 254-87.
544. See SAVIGNY, supra note 13; see generally Reimann, supra note 7.
545. See generally Weinberger, supra note 84.
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expectations, commercial efficiency, and business convenience. The
supremacy of party autonomy on both sides of the Atlantic has ensured
that many of these optimal goals are attained. There are only a limited
number of U.S. states that adhere to antediluvian positivistic tendencies
in choice of law or are totally dependent on solipsistic determination of
*
interest
analysis. 546
The trend, by accident rather than by explicit design, has been
toward convergence of Anglo-American principles. In this regard, the
fears of a number of critics, especially Nadelmann and others in the
United States, who have stigmatized the Rome Convention (now
Regulation) as inhibiting harmonization, rather than securing it, have
proved unfounded in this area.s4 7 The argument has been that, as the
Member States of the European Community agree upon uniform choice
of law provisions, it will reduce the prospects of broader harmonization
through, for example, the Hague Convention on Private International
Law or other internationally-based agreements.54 8 The counterargument, of course, is that it is easier for other states to discuss
harmonization with a group of European Community states, which all
have the same rules. As has been witnessed in other spheres of private
international law, developments at a European level have provided a
template for discussion of worldwide harmonization of effective
principles. The new Rome I Regulation, modernizing choice of law in
contract principles after a period of reflective consideration on the
impact of the earlier Rome Convention, may beneficially serve as a
catalyst to enervate multinational discussions in the contract arena. 54 9
Viewed as a "quasi-political instrument," the Rome Convention, and
modernization in the Rome I Regulation, have achieved the immediate
objective of harmonization within the European Community, albeit at a
slower pace than originally intended by the drafters, and without total
coverage.550 The overall schematic approach that is adopted by the

Rome I Regulation in relation to contractual obligations, as stated
herein, should be welcomed. It reflects a laudable attempt to bring
harmonization and certainty to the area and clarification in a number of
respects. Certain caveats remain, however, over the success of the
scheme, specifically the restrictive nature of both its subject-matter visci-vis the whole of the field of private international law, and its scope in
terms of the number of issues that are excluded. Indeed, these
546. See Symeonides, supra note 35.
547. See Nadelmann, supra note 227; Nadelmann, Clouds Over InternationalEfforts to
Unify Rules of Conflict Laws, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (1977); see generally NORTH,
ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 80, at 132-43.

54 8. Id.
549. See generally REED, supra note 8; Reimann, supra note 7; Zhang, supra note 7.
550. See Bonomi, supra note 429; Lando & Nielsen, supra note 429.
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drawbacks, combined with the fact that the extent of the application of
many of the key provisions are opaque, and will require judicial
elucidation by the Court of Justice, undoubtedly have a deleterious
impact on the overall goal of harmonization. On the specific issue of
clarity of provisions, the Convention adopted a Protocol of
Interpretation which empowers the European Court to give preliminary
rulings on the interpretation of ambiguous provisions. Of course, rulings
of the Court are invariably binding on Member States. Nevertheless, the
Protocol in question only specifies that the national courts may request a
ruling when they consider that a decision on the question is necessary to
enable them to give a judgment; no compulsion exists to refer to the
Court for a preliminary ruling.
The essence of the Rome I Regulation is to be found in Articles 3
and 4, as newly formulated. Express and implied choice are maintained
by Article 3, albeit in the latter case the choice must now be "clearly
demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the
case."551 An applicable standard for determination, it is suggested, can
be found by the teleological interpretation provided by Lord Justice
Mance in American Motorists Insurance Co., Ltd.552 Mechanistic hardand-fast rules are provided for eight discrete and specific types of
agreement in Article 4(1). A real point of tension in the Rome I
Regulation remains the characteristic performance presumption of
Article 4(2), albeit its significance has been downgraded. The
presumption has been the subject of hostile criticism, 3 but it is
adduced that it does fulfil a useful purpose. Business efficiency and
convenience, as well as party expectations, are important goals in the
absence of express choice. These can, arguably, best be attained by a
fixed choice of law presumption pointing to the law of a county to
which an identifiable party belongs. Indeed, as North has intimated,55 4
viewed as an aspect of reform, the conclusion would seem to be that
"characteristic performance" is unlikely to do much harm, and might do
some good but there might have to be "a prolonged period of
gestation, s3and thus uncertainty whilst the courts clothe the concept
with more legal flesh and blood.
In similar vein, substantive principles still need to be casuistically
distilled in the Regulation as to the requirements when the mechanistic
hard-and-fast rules or characteristic performance test can be flexibly
551. Rome 1,supra note 11, art. 3(1).
552. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., [2003] I.L. Pr. 370.
553. See D'Oliveira,supra note 80.
554. NORTH, ESSAYS INPRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 80, at 140.
555. Id.; see ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 (2d ed. 1990).
556.

NORTH, FORTY YEARS ON: THE EVOLUTION OF POSTWAR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL

LAW INEUROPE 29, at 44 (1990).
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displaced by the escape device of "closest connection" within the
purview of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 4. It would accord with the
adaptation of either a strong or weak presumption threshold test. Prior
judicial precedents, as stated, have revealed that a test of "commercial
efficiency " that is objectively judged by reference to the expectations of
those in the relevant market, albeit interpretatively beneficial, fails to
provide a panacea to this dilemma in all cases.5 5 7 A dual test is
propounded herein as a potential cathartic solution, derived from a
"centre of gravity" of the agreement perspective, allied to a focus on a
"clear preponderance of relevant factors."s8 This would ensure a
stronger displacement theory in line with the newly drafted provisions,
and reflect purposive intentions.
Similar difficulties apply in the context of the Second Restatement in
relation to the interplay and synergy between sections 187(2) and 188.
The requirement of a "reasonable basis" for party choice in the absence
of a "substantial relationship" under the Restatement is open to the
criticisms that confront any rule based upon a test of reasonableness.
Arguably to require attorneys and courts to find a "substantial"
relationship, however defined, each time a stipulation is made is an
unnecessary barrier and an unnecessary uncertainty without any
concomitant advantages. As Weinberger has cogently stated, it may
well have been more adventitious to have laid down a "reasonable
concern" or a "reasonable interest" instead of a substantial relationship
template.5 5 9 Imputed choice applies in section 188 through the "most
significant relationship" test and the myriad of "interest" factors stated
in section 6. As with the Rome I Regulation flexible escape device of
"closest connection," one may be thrown back in reality to a "contactcounting approach" to choice of law in which the factual connections of
the case with different jurisdictions are separated out and added together
for each jurisdiction. The putative search, as with the Rome I
Regulation, is standards based to determine the contract's real "centre of
gravity." As Lando presaged nearly thirty years ago, "the conflict-oflaw rules of the two countries will approach each other considerably.
One day our successors may then meet again .

.

. and discuss .

.

. an

American-European Restatement on the Conflict of Laws." 560
Pragmatism has prevailed over functional choice of law principles in
contract. Party autonomy now reigns supreme and imputed choice is
heavily dependent on addressing the factual "centre of gravity" of the
contract. There has been a convergence of Anglo-American principles
in this respect that is not replicated in other branches of private
557.
558.
559.
560.

Supra notes 375-377.
See generally supra notes 377-82.
See Weinberger, supra note 84.
Lando, supra note 19, at 35.
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international law. Once Currie's ideology commanded the centre stage
of the choice of law revolution much of American conflict of laws
literature begin to take on a distinctive ethnocentric hue. This has now
been displaced by pragmatism in contract conflicts with European
autonomist rationale proving more suitable for transplantation to the
United States, and state court propagation of the Second Restatement
acting as a solicitous guardian. A significant reapprochement of ideals
has become a hardy perennial for toilers in this particular garden,
commenced by the Rome Convention and enhanced now into fuller
bloom by the Rome I Regulation revisions:
It might ... be possible to come gradually to at least a degree of
"reapprochement" between European and American systems,
which would be a very positive development. "In a world in
which transnational contracts multiply daily, it is important that
this aspect of international legal intercourse should be governed
by similar processes." 56 '

561. Edoardo Vitta, The Impact in Europe of the American "Conflicts Revolution, " 30 AM.
J. COMP. L. 1, 18 (1982).
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